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Abstract 
This master thesis aims at determining the patterns of internalization of multinationals 
and at evaluating the potential effects of third countries on inward FDI in the Czech Republic. 
To meet these objectives, I employed the knowledge-capital model of Markusen et al. (1996) 
and the extended spatial lag model of Blonigen et al. (2005) on a firm-level dataset of foreign 
affiliates located in the Czech Republic for the period from 2003 to 2008. Empirical analyses 
were conducted on data at different levels of aggregation to demonstrate the relevance of data 
disaggregation and heterogeneity. The results provided an empirical evidence for horizontal 
and vertical motives of internalization, with the prevalence of either motive varying across 
the sectors and the levels of aggregation. Effects of third countries on inward FDI were found 
to exert impact on a number of sectors of activity. Nevertheless, statistical significance of the 
results appeared to be highly sensitive to the geographical composition of data.   
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1 
Introduction 
   
During the last decade, the importance of foreign direct investment in the Czech Republic 
has grown substantially. The average FDI flows during the period 2003-2008 amounted to 3.3% 
of GDP, whilst the cumulative FDI stocks for the same period reached in average 35% of GDP. 
There is a plethora of empirical studies on determinants and impacts of the FDI on the Czech 
Republic itself or within a wider range of Central and Eastern European countries. Nonetheless, 
the number of studies on the pattern of internalization of multinationals (MNEs) activities and/or 
on the possible impact of third countries on the FDI in the Czech Republic is rather few.  
Driven by this research gap, I have decided to carry out an empirical study to disentangle 
different types of FDI in the Czech Republic and to assess the third country effects on inward 
FDI in the Czech Republic.  
In order to meet the first objective, I will employ the knowledge-capital model, developed by 
Markusen et al. (1996), whose specification allows for the distinction between the two main 
pattern of internalization, horizontal (market seeking) and vertical (efficiency seeking) FDI.   
This model has been chosen as it is by far the most comprehensive model built on economic 
theory that captures both types of FDI. 
In order to meet the second objective, I will capture the third country effects through spatial 
linkage (spatial lag) model, in line with other empirical studies on the issue (e.g. Blonigen et al. 
2005, 2007, Baltagi et al. 2005, Garretsen and Peeters 2008). 
The contributions of the master thesis are several. To my best knowledge, this is the first 
empirical research on the pattern of internalization of multinationals in the Czech Republic. 
Studying the pattern of internalization of MNEs is meaningful, as each type of FDI impacts on 
and is affected by the host’s economy in a different way1. In addition, the empirical testing of 
                                                 
1
 For instance, whilst horizontal FDI and trade are substitutes, vertical FDI and trade are complements. 
Horizontal FDI are more capital-intensive and hence are expected to create larger spillover effects, whilst vertical 
FDI are more labour-intensive and hence are expected to influence more significantly labour market (Beugelsdijk et 
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the knowledge-capital model in the context of the Czech Republic will contribute to enhance 
the validity and explanatory power of the model. 
Another contribution of the work dwells in the empirical testing for third country effects on 
Czech inward FDI, as this will be the pilot research for this geographic area. Moreover, 
the spatial lag model employed does not capture only the third country effects, but also enables 
to identify more complex patterns of internalization, that go beyond the framework of 
the knowledge-capital model.  
The last contribution of the thesis is the level of data aggregation, as the empirical analyses 
will be carried out on sector and firm-level data. It has been widely recognised by researchers that 
FDI analyses on aggregated country level data may provide inaccurate and blurred results, as 
determinants, impacts and types of FDI may vary across the sectors and across the firms. Data at 
disaggregated level enable to capture the sector and firm heterogeneity and thus provide more 
accurate results. 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter two summarizes the extant literature, both 
theoretical and empirical. Chapter three presents the theoretical background of the thesis. Chapter 
four specifies empirical models and hypotheses to be tested, sources of data and estimation 
approaches. Chapter five interprets the estimation results and chapter six concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
al. 2008). Horizontal FDI are positively correlated with volatility of supply shocks, while the opposite holds for 
vertical FDI (Aizenman and Marion 2004).  
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2 
Literature Review  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is at providing literature review associated with factors determining 
the main patterns of internalization. Study of the extant literature revealed three sources of 
determinants that exert influence on the patterns of internalization: country characteristics, 
industry and firm heterogeneity and third country effects. 
Country characteristics refer to traditional FDI determinants such as country size, relative 
factor endowment and trade costs. The main theoretical model encompassing these characteristics 
and their impact on the horizontal and vertical patterns of internalization is the knowledge-capital 
model, developed by Markusen et al. (1996) and Markusen (1997, 2002). Since this model is 
the workhorse model of my analysis, I will briefly introduce it in the first section of the chapter 
and I will provide a more detailed description of the model in the following chapter. 
The development of the knowledge-capital model has triggered a wave of empirical studies 
aiming at detecting the existence of vertical FDI versus horizontal FDI. Early empirical works 
employed predominantly aggregated, country level data. With the availability of further data, it 
became clear that the industry and firm heterogeneity play a role in determining the pattern of 
internalization. Thus, in order to correctly determine the existence of vertical FDI versus 
horizontal FDI, it is not sufficient to study the data at aggregated, country level. Instead, it 
appears more appropriate to employ the data at more disaggregated level that allow for industry 
and firm heterogeneity. This issue is surveyed in the second section of the chapter. 
The availability of more detailed data also enabled researchers to uncover new patterns of 
trade and FDI flows. In particular, they revealed that the integration strategies of multinationals 
are rather complex. The multinationals do not enter only into purely horizontal or purely vertical 
FDI, but they also engage in export platforms FDI from which they serve other countries or they 
slice up the production process and locate them in multiple nearby countries. These complex 
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internalization patterns suggest that the characteristics of third (adjacent) countries may affect 
the locational decisions of multinationals as well as their choice of internalization strategy. 
The relevant empirical literature on the issue is presented in the last section of the chapter. 
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2.2 Main Patterns of Internalization 
  
Models of trade theory based on general equilibrium have identified two main patterns 
of internalization. According to the first pattern, firms become multinationals in order to reduce 
production costs, whereas the second pattern of internalization assumes that firms become 
multinationals in order to gain better access to foreign markets and to avoid trade costs. Models 
analyzing the determinants of the earlier pattern are the factor proportion or vertical models. 
The proximity concentration or horizontal models focus on the later pattern. 
The vertical model of multinationals was first developed by Helpman (1984) and Helpman 
and Krugman (1985). The rationale behind the development of the model was a desire to define 
a general equilibrium theory, which states the conditions under which the multinationals emerge 
and which is capable of predicting the trade patterns under these conditions. 
The basic idea behind the theory of vertical multinationals is the ability of firms to exploit 
factor price differences in the world by fragmenting the production process into stages             
and locating them into places where they can be most cheaply produced. Vertical FDI can be 
characterised as one directional trade in intermediate inputs or final products between divisions of 
the same firm in the sense that firms from richly endowed countries with human capital are active 
in the countries richly endowed in labour. Thus, the main motive for internalization in the vertical 
model is to attain lower production costs. 
In the Helpman’s (1984) and Helpman and Krugman’s (1985) model, the headquarter 
services and plant production are undertaken in the same country unless there are factor price 
differences. However, the multinationals will emerge only if factor price differences and (or) 
factor intensity differences are high enough for firms to find it optimal to fragment the production 
process into stages and to separate them geographically. The fragmentation will tend to push up 
labour demand in foreign country and reduce the demand in home country, which will in turn 
lead towards the convergence in factor prices.  
Concurrently with the vertical model of Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984) developed 
a horizontal model of multinationals, which was later on refined by Markusen and Venables 
(1998, 2000). The rationale behind the model formulation was an empirical observation of 
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the large volume of trade and direct investments between countries with similar labour 
and wealth endowments, which was at odds with the predictions of the vertical model. 
The crucial assumption of the horizontal model is the existence of firm level scale economies 
and existence of transport costs (trade barriers). Horizontal direct investments refer to the firms 
producing similar final products in plants abroad as at home market, and these plants are supplied 
by headquarters services. Multinationals of this type represent an alternative to vertical 
multinationals and are characterised as market or asset-seeking, two-plant firms producing the 
same products abroad to serve the local market. The aim of horizontal multinationals is to 
decrease the trade costs associated with supplying the market from abroad and to exploit firm 
level economies of scale. 
In the horizontal model, the firms face two options – either to serve the foreign market by 
exporting or via the production in the foreign country. The multinationals will emerge only if 
the plant specific economies of scale relative to firm-specific economies of scale are low enough 
and (or) the transport costs are high enough so that it pays to set up a plant abroad and produce 
the same products as at home.  
The distinction between the vertical and horizontal multinationals is meaningful, since they 
do not differ only in the motive for internalization, but also in their impact on the economy. For 
instance, in the case of vertical MNEs, trade and FDI are complements; since the intermediate 
products or final goods are traded within the firms (parent and affiliates) until they reach 
the target markets to be sold. On the other hand, the horizontal MNE imposes a trade off between 
FDI and trade, since the production abroad is not shipped back home but is directly sold on the 
foreign markets. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the vertical and horizontal models: 
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Table 1: Vertical vs. Horizontal Models Comparison 
Vertical (factor proportion) model Horizontal (proximity concentration) 
model
Model assumptions 2x2x2 (two-factor, two-sector, two-country) 2x2x2 (two-factor, two-sector, two-country)
Perfect competition Imperfect Cournot competition
Zero transport costs Positive transport costs
Constant returns to scale Firm scale economies
Firm structure and 
production
Single plant producing intermediates or final 
products, fragmented production
Two plants producing same goods and 
services in both countries
One-directional activity Two-directional activity
Output division Home country demand Host country demand
Trade and affiliate sales are complements Trade and affiliate sales are substitutes
Main motives for 
internalization
Differences in factor endowments (prices) High trade costs
Similarity of countries in factor endowments 
(prices)
Similarity in market sizes
Plant level economies of scale are low 
relative to firm level economies of scale
Welfare effects Increased in both countries Increased in both countries
Income distribution
Reduced absolute wage differences across 
countries; alteration of relative wages within 
countries
Income in each country may be increased 
without changing the distribution of income.
Source: Helpman (1984), Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) 
 
The horizontal model expects both headquarters and production activities to use the factors 
of production in the same proportion or to use only one factor of production. This assumption 
induces factor prices to be similar and thus there is no reason for vertical multinationals to arise. 
On the other hand, the initial vertical model of multinationals developed by Helpman and 
Krugman (1985) assumed zero trade costs and no firm level scale economies. This assumption 
gives no reason for horizontal multinationals to emerge. 
Led by these restrictions of the horizontal and vertical models, Markusen et al. (1996)        
and Markusen (1997, 2002) integrated the vertical and horizontal models in a single general 
equilibrium model, known as the knowledge-capital model (KC model). The main feature of    
the model was that it allowed trade costs between the countries to be positive and at the same 
time it assumed different factor intensities across activities, giving the motivations for both 
vertical and horizontal multinationals to emerge. In addition, the model assumed the existence of 
the knowledge based assets that create firm level scale economies. Thus, the knowledge-capital 
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model does not only unify horizontal and vertical motive, but it also brings a new aspect in 
the form of knowledge based assets.  
In the knowledge-capital model, the vertical and horizontal MNEs arise endogenously.        
By encompassing both types of MNEs, the FDI between countries in the KC model is a function 
of all variables considered in the vertical and horizontal model together, comprising market sizes, 
relative factor endowments, trade costs and investment barriers. 
The rationales behind the emergence of vertical or horizontal multinationals in the KC model 
remain consistent with those in the vertical and the horizontal models. Differences in factor prices 
give rise to vertical fragmentation whereas similarities in factor endowments induce horizontal 
activities. In addition, the knowledge-capital model predicts that the incentives for vertical MNEs 
are strongest when the home country is simultaneously small and skilled labour abundant.         
On the other hand, horizontal MNEs most likely emerge when the home country is slightly more 
skilled labour abundant than the host country. A more detailed description of the theory 
and empirical specification of the knowledge-capital model will be provided in the next chapter. 
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2.3 Empirical Evidence on the Knowledge-capital Model 
2.3.1 Empirical Studies on Country Level Data 
 
Carr et al. (2001) were the first who proposed an empirical specification drawn from 
the theoretical predictions of the knowledge-capital model. By pooling the U.S. inward            
and outward affiliate sales over the period 1986-1994, the authors found a strong support for the 
KC model. In particular, their results suggested that affiliate sales increased in the total income of 
the host and home countries, in skilled labour endowment differences and in convergence in 
income between the host and home countries, while reduced in dissimilarities in size. In addition, 
home countries which are simultaneously skilled labour abundant and small have higher affiliate 
sales. Lastly, a bilateral increase in parent and host country trade costs decreases affiliate 
production, so trade and investment are complements and generally decreases affiliate production 
when host country is a developing country but increases affiliate production when host country is 
high income country. 
Markusen and Maskus (2001b) extended the work of Carr et al. (2001) by decomposing 
foreign affiliate production data into sales to the host country market and export sales. The aim of 
the paper was to obtain the horizontal versus vertical distinction that, according to the author, was 
not explicitly considered in Carr et al (2001). The estimation results fitted well the theory. Host 
country market size was more important for production for local sales than for export sales, while 
the opposite held for host country skilled labour scarcity. Investment and trade cots barriers of 
the host country exerted a stronger negative influence on production for export sales than on 
production for local sales. Unlike Carr et al. (2001) who tested the model on two-way data, 
Markusen and Maskus (2001b) examined the model on U.S. outward data only, since they 
enabled a breakdown of export sales into sales back to the home country and sales to third 
countries. 
Nonetheless, Markusen and Maskus (2001b) found some quantitative difference compared to 
two way sample results of Carr et al. (2001). In particular, they found out that host country 
unskilled labour abundance had little effect on the production for export sales. This would 
suggest that U.S. outward investment was not primarily drawn by comparative advantage motive, 
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which was at odds with the results of Carr et al. (2001) where production for export sales was 
drawn to unskilled labour abundant countries. Markusen and Maskus (2001b) nevertheless noted 
that despite this discordance, the results are qualitatively similar to those of Carr et al. (2001) as 
unskilled labour abundance in the host is relatively more important for export sales.  
Markusen and Maskus (2002a) performed a testing of the vertical, the horizontal 
and the knowledge-capital model against each other using the same dataset as Carr et al. (2001). 
Their results indicated that the horizontal could not be statistically distinguished from 
the knowledge-capital model, whilst the vertical model was decisively rejected. Based on this, 
they concluded that the horizontal investment is much more important than vertical investment 
motivated by factor endowment differences. In addition, the authors interpreted the results as 
supportive for the knowledge-capital model, but not distinguishable in aggregate data from 
the horizontal model and that the vertical model poorly characterized the overall pattern of world 
FDI activity. 
Blonigen et al. (2002) argued that empirical specification of the knowledge-capital model in 
Carr et al. (2001) is mispecified in the proxy for skill labour differences. The authors claimed that 
when corrected for the misspecification, the econometric results provided the support for 
the horizontal model of MNEs. Nonetheless, in their reply, Carr et al. (2003) also pointed out 
flaws existing in the approach of Blonigen et al. (2002), specifically that the proposed alternative 
for the proxy of skilled difference is not consistent with the existing theory of the knowledge-
capital model. In fact, they reckoned that it was the papers of Markusen and Maskus (2001b, 
2002a), which correctly empirically translated the knowledge-capital model, not the one of 
Blonigen et al. (2002). 
Davies (2002) argued that the empirical specification of Carr et al. (2001) must be amended 
by including a third order polynomial in skill differences to correctly capture some of the implied 
nonlinearities of the theoretical model. In particular, a cubic term would enable to detect 
the maximum point, where horizontal FDI peaks, and the inflection point, where horizontal 
multinationals are replaced by vertical multinationals. He found favorable evidence of               
the knowledge-capital model only when using FDI stocks as proxy for multinational activities 
and total years of schooling as proxy for skill endowments. 
Braconier et al. (2002) used the wage as a proxy for skill labour and investigated the impact 
of wage costs on FDI data from Sweden and the USA. The authors found a strong evidence of 
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the knowledge-capital model, confirming the results of Carr et al. (2001). In particular, the 
authors found that the importance of vertical FDI is higher than claimed by previous studies. One 
of the reasons for this finding is that the authors used the data from Sweden, which is a small, 
skilled labour abundant country whereas the previous studies used solely data from the U.S. 
affiliate sales. According to the knowledge-capital model, the vertical FDI is more likely to 
emerge when the home country is small and skilled labour abundance. Their findings suggest that 
it is meaningful to estimate the data from other countries than the United States. 
Later on, Braconier et al. (2003) extended their previous work (Braconier et al. 2002) by 
employing better data specifications for relative skill endowments and for affiliate sales, about 
which the authors claimed to have superior coverage as compared to previous studies. Braconier 
et al. (2003) confirmed the KC model and considered their empirical specifications to be 
comparable with the theoretical predications of the KC model. The authors conclude that in 
previous studies, the empirical specifications captured only indirectly the theoretical predications 
of the KC model, resulting in ambiguous results. 
Recently, some researchers have focused on the econometric improvement of                     
the knowledge-capital empirical specification. For instance, Mariel et al. (2009) undertook a time 
varying coefficient approach in testing the KC model, as they claimed that allowing                  
the parameters of the model to vary over time made it possible to follow the changes in the nature 
of FDI, such as the conversion of vertical FDI to horizontal FDI between two converging 
economies. The authors tested non-parametrically a time varying coefficient variety of              
the knowledge-capital model on a bilateral panel data over 22 years and found out that the 
vertical component of the knowledge-capital model is relevant even for the countries with similar 
endowments. On the other hand, Tanaka (2009) addressed possible endogeneity in data in the KC 
model specification by using the system of generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimator 
and found a weak support for vertical component of FDI. 
The ambiguous results of above mentioned studies have well documented the complexity    
of the knowledge-capital model, which cannot be solved to yield an unambiguous estimating 
equation. As noted by Carr et al. (2003, p. 995): “...the knowledge-capital model, a hybrid of       
a vertical and a horizontal model, is a conceptually difficult one for estimation. Relationships 
predicted by the model are not only non-linear but non-monotonic. The implication of this is that 
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there is room for reasonable disagreement as to what the appropriate estimation equation should 
be.”  
Another reason for the variance in the results is the selection of data. Firstly, the majority of 
studies employed the data on U.S. outward and/or inward affiliate sales/FDI. The United States is 
classified as a large and skilled labour country, which restricted the observation to an area in 
the North East section of the Edgeworth boxes (see Chapter 3 for further discussion). Thus, 
the results may have missed the vertical pattern as the knowledge-capital predicts that vertical 
FDI should flow primarily from small skilled-labour abundant countries. Secondly, the regression 
analyses in these studies were run on aggregated, country level data and thus ignored the possible 
firm or industry heterogeneity. This issue is discussed in the following section. 
 
2.3.2 Empirical Studies on Industry and Firm Level Data 
 
The knowledge-capital model, as well as the vertical and horizontal models, is based on 
the assumption of firm symmetry in predicting the patterns of internalization. Such an assumption 
implied that all firms export unless there is pressure for the formation of multinationals. 
However, with the availability of firm level data, empirical studies on foreign trade revealed that 
not all firms within an industry export nor are all industries engaged in foreign trade to the same 
extent. In view of these findings, certain trade theorist casted doubt on the validity of                
the symmetry assumption and included industrial and organisational heterogeneity in trade theory 
models instead (Antràs 2003, Melitz 2003, Helpman et al. 2004, Antràs and Helpman 2006). 
The introduction of heterogeneity in international trade led to the recognition that the pattern 
of internalization may differ along sectoral or firm-specific characteristics, which in turn implied 
that cross country data alone may not be sufficient to disentangle the vertical or horizontal FDI 
patterns. 
Yeaple (2003) noted that most of empirical studies detecting the existence of vertical FDI 
versus horizontal FDI are based on the aggregated data. By constructing comparative advantage 
indices for a group of countries, he revealed that in skilled labour scarce host countries, FDI 
flows are concentrated in low skill intensive industries, whereas in skilled labour abundant host 
countries, FDI flows are concentrated in high skill intensive industries.  
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This finding led him to argue that in order to test empirical relevance of the vertical FDI, it is 
not sufficient to simulate the patterns of FDI across countries while holding industry 
characteristics fixed. Instead, it is necessary to include an interaction term, which exploits both 
cross industry variation in factor intensity, as well as cross country variation in factor 
endowments. More specifically, he claims that it follows from the theoretical predictions of 
the vertical model, that FDI from industries intensive in a particular factor will flow to 
the countries abundant in that particular factor. He ran a regression equation of the knowledge-
capital model, including in addition a vector of variables reflecting a potential host country’s unit 
cost of production by sector. His results were strongly supportive for the vertical motive of 
internalization. 
Hanson et al. (2003) have obtained a robust evidence for the vertical dimension of U.S. 
multinationals. The authors claimed, based on the results, that vertically motivated FDI are likely 
more important than what was suggested by Carr et al. (2001). According to them, the reason 
why they found strong evidence of vertical FDI was because of the use of micro-level data on 
foreign affiliates whereas previous work used data that were aggregated across the activities of a 
given affiliate and also across all affiliates. 
Geishecker and Görg (2005) shared the same view as Hanson et al. (2003) by claiming that 
the “vertical investment controversy” in the paper of Carr et al. (2001) was due to the fact, that 
the authors used data on total aggregated affiliate sales which disregarded the potential 
heterogeneity in different types of multinational activity.  Geishecker and Görg (2005) employed 
the specification of Blonigen et al. (2003) on bilateral FDI in manufacturing and services for 
a number of industrialized countries. Their results revealed a strong support of a vertical FDI 
component within manufacturing and horizontal FDI component within services industries. 
According to the authors, these findings clearly indicated that by allowing for heterogeneity, 
a more differentiated picture on patterns of internalization can be drawn. 
Anghel (2007) followed the approach of Geishecker and Görg (2005) and tested 
the knowledge-capital model on a panel of affiliates of multinationals in 7 transition countries. In 
addition, she also considered separately different sectors of activity in both manufacturing 
and services and between various home countries of multinationals. By employing the empirical 
specification of Carr et al. (2001) on disaggregated data, Anghel (2007) proved that there is 
a combination of vertical and horizontal FDI in the region, with horizontal motive prevailing. 
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Based on the results, the author concluded that transition countries started being attractive for 
foreign investors not only because of their low unit labour costs, but also because of their market 
potential. 
Waldkirch (2007) pointed out, that one of the biggest obstacles in determining                    
the multinational activity remains the availability of high quality micro data, which is comparable 
across countries. Alfaro et al. (2009) used a firm level dataset to characterize global patterns of 
multinational activity and argued that data limitations have led the empirical literature to 
systematically underestimate vertical FDI, which is far more prevalent than previously thought. 
The authors used a combination of four digit sector level information and input-output tables to 
distinguish horizontal and vertical FDI by classifying a horizontal subsidiary as a plant in 
the same sector code as the foreign owner parent, and a vertical subsidiary as a plant that 
produces in sectors that are inputs to the foreign parent’s product. The results showed                
the importance of vertical activity in terms of number of subsidiaries and number of employees. 
Alfaro et al. (2009) claimed that due to the data limitations, there has been a misclassification 
of vertical FDI where subsidiaries supplying goods to their parents are located in the same two-
digit Standard Industrial Classification code as their parents but in different industries when 
disaggregating to the four-digit level. Alfaro et al. (2009) dubbed this type of vertical FDI “intra-
industry vertical FDI” and claimed them to be qualitatively different from “inter-industry vertical 
FDI” that cross two-digit industry codes. More specifically, the authors found out that intra-
industry vertical FDI are not driven by comparative advantage (factor proportion) motive as inter-
industry vertical FDI and they occur predominantly between rich countries with a small skill 
labour endowment differences. Multinationals tend to undertake intra-industry vertical FDI for 
high-skill and later stages of production and inter-industry vertical FDI for low-skill inputs from 
low-skill countries. The fact that intra-industry vertical FDI occurs predominantly between 
developed countries with small relative factor endowment differences made researchers to 
misclassify it as horizontal FDI. This is further enhanced by the data limitation, since the intra-
industry vertical FDI is visible only at more disaggregated level (e.g. four digit level). 
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2.4 Third Country Effects and Complex Nature of Multinationals  
 
Soon after the development of the knowledge-capital model, some researchers started 
emphasizing the role of hybrid multinationals, which are neither purely horizontal nor purely 
vertical. In their papers, the authors relaxed from the two country framework and instead put 
emphasis the role of endowments and trade and investment costs of third countries. 
Ekholm et al. (2003), Yeaple (2003), Hanson et al. (2003) addressed a phenomenon of 
‘export platform’ FDI, where a parent country invests in a host country with the aim to serve 
third markets with exports from the affiliates in the host country. Baltagi et al. (2005) focused on 
the “complex vertical” FDI, where a parent country sets up a vertical chain of production across 
multiple (nearby) countries to exploit the comparative advantage of various locations. Both 
export platform and complex vertical FDI suggest that FDI decisions cannot be properly captured 
without considering the effects of third countries and their omission in econometric estimations 
may lead to biased parameter estimates of the determinants of bilateral FDI. 
The empirical studies that include third country effects in FDI analysis are rather rare. In 
general, these papers have indentified two potential channels for such effects: market proximity 
effect and spatial interactions. 
Coughlin and Segev (2000) were the first who employed the spatial econometric techniques 
while controlling for standard determinants of FDI. The authors tested a spatial dependence on 
a sample of inward FDI to 29 Chinese regions and found evidence of positive spatial 
autoregression. The results indicated that increased FDI in a province has positive effects on FDI 
in nearby provinces. 
In their studies of locational choice, Head and Mayer (2004) found out that market potential 
variable proxied as distance weighted average GDP’s of adjacent countries exerted a positive 
influence on the locational choice of Japanese multinationals in Europe. In particular, their results 
indicated that a ten percent increase in a market potential variable raised by three to eleven 
percent the chance of a region being chosen, depending on the specification.  
Blonigen et al. (2005) estimated the importance of parent market proximity effect 
and of interactions between FDI from different parents for a sample of US inward FDI data over 
1983 to 1998 via a spatial lag regression. Their results revealed a strong positive effect of parent 
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market proximity. However, the impact of spatial lag appeared to be sensitive to data sample, as 
it turned out to be significant only for the sub-sample of European parents. 
Baltagi et al. (2005) captured third countries effects through two types of spatial interaction – 
spatially lagged explanatory variables motivated by a three factor knowledge-capital model 
reflecting third country characteristics; and spatial autoregressive errors to control for regional 
interdependencies of stochastic shocks between host countries. The model was tested on a dataset 
of bilateral U.S. outward FDI stocks and affiliate sales at the industry level. The authors used 
inverse distance as spatial weights and found that weighted regressors were jointly significant at 
1% level, indicating a strong importance of third country effects, emphasizing the role of U.S. 
complex outward FDI. 
Blonigen et al. (2007) employed a similar approach as Baltagi et al. (2005) and tested third 
country effects via spatial interactions in the U.S. outbound foreign direct investment. In addition, 
they included a market potential variable proxied by spatially weighted market sizes of adjacent 
countries. They claimed that spatial lag can be grounded upon FDI theory by analyzing              
the importance of spatial lag combined with market potential for four categories of multinationals 
(i.e. pure horizontal and pure vertical, export platform and vertical complex FDI).  Nevertheless, 
unlike Baltagi et al. (2005), they found that traditional determinants of FDI are robust to 
the inclusion of spatial interdependence, although the empirical evidence suggests the contrary. 
In addition, the authors also included country fixed effects to test for the third country effects 
and their results rendered spatial insignificant in most cases. This led the authors to conclude that 
the spatial autoregression can be captured by country fixed effects and the significance of spatial 
lag is sensitive to the selection of host countries.  
Garretsen and Peeters (2008) took a similar approach as Blonigen et al. (2007) and employed 
a spatial lag model to test for the relevance of third country effects in the Dutch outbound FDI. 
The authors confirmed the findings of Blonigen et al. (2007) to a certain extent, since 
the estimation results revealed that the inclusion of fixed country effects reduced the importance 
of spatial lag significantly, although it remained statistically significant. In addition, Garretsen 
and Peeters (2008) also found evidence that the third country effects are transmitted through 
other channels, specifically through the market potential and tax variables. 
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2.5 Summary 
 
This chapter provided a literature review of factors determining the internalization patterns 
of multinationals. It identified two main motives for internalization of production: the factor 
proportion motive, leading to vertical FDI and the market access motive, leading to horizontal 
FDI. These two motives are embedded in the knowledge-capital model of Markusen et al. (1996) 
and Markusen (1997, 2002), which provides a unifying framework for disentangling different 
type of foreign direct investment. According to the knowledge-capital model, country specific 
characteristics, such as market size, relative factor endowment and trade costs are important in 
determining the pattern of internalization.  
Early empirical works testing the knowledge-capital model predominantly employed 
aggregated, country level data. Nonetheless, later empirical studies proved that the level of data 
aggregation may play a crucial role in determining the pattern of internalization. Data at more 
disaggregated level enables to detect the intra-industry nature of vertical FDI which is not 
revealed at more aggregated level. In addition, disaggregated data allows for industry and firm 
heterogeneity to take effect. 
The existence of complex multinational strategies, such as export platform or complex 
vertical FDI suggests that the knowledge-capital model may not be accurate in explaining 
complex strategies since it deals only with pure horizontal and pure vertical FDI and omits third 
country effects, which may be relevant. The empirical studies captured the third country effects 
through market potential effect (or parent market proximity for inward FDI) and spatial 
interactions. The estimation results predominantly confirmed the relevance of market 
potential/parent market proximity effect. On the other hand, the evidence on the spatial linkage is 
somewhat ambiguous. While some studies confirmed its significance (e.g. Coughlin and Segev 
2000, Baltagi et al. 2005, Garretsen and Peeters 2008), other studies (Blonigen et al. 2005, 2007) 
pointed out that the significance of spatial lag is sensitive to the data tested and can be 
substantially reduced by inclusion of fixed effects. 
Based on the literature review, I have decided to employ the knowledge-capital model to 
disentangle the internalization pattern of multinationals in the Czech Republic. This model will 
be applied on data at firm and industry levels in order to control for possible heterogeneity effect. 
In addition, I will also test the relevance of third country effects on MNEs’ decisions to invest in 
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the Czech Republic by including spatial lag and parent and host market proximities in the 
empirical model.  
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3 
Model Background  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the empirical model specification will be built based on 
the knowledge-capital model and the third country effects. Accordingly, this chapter will focus 
on these two issues with the aim at providing some insights in the theories behind them. 
Since the knowledge-capital model is conceptually and theoretically more complex, a great 
deal of the chapter will be devoted to its discussion. Thus, the first section of the chapter starts 
with the KC model’s assumptions, continues by equilibrium conditions discussion and then turns 
to the presentation of the simulation results. The second section of the chapter introduces 
the channels through which third countries may affect inbound FDI, with a special focus on 
spatial linkages. 
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3.2 The Knowledge-capital Model 
 
3.2.1 Model Assumptions 
The knowledge-capital model is a two factor, two sector and two country model set up on 
the following assumptions: 
 There are two countries: home (parent) country i and foreign (host) country j. 
 The countries consist of two sectors (X and Y): sector Y produces a homogenous product 
under constant returns to scale and perfect competition, while sector X produces goods 
under increasing returns to scale at firm level.  
 Sector X encompasses a large number of imperfectly competitive firms that are 
symmetric, subject to constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and operate under Cournot 
competition. 
 Sector Y serves as numeraire. 
 There is free entry and exit of firms in sector X. 
 Overall utility is separable and homothetic in its arguments. 
 The utility of a representative consumer is a Cobb-Douglas function. 
 There are two factors of production: skilled labour (S) and composite factor (L), including 
other factors (unskilled labour, land, capital). The factors are mobile between the two 
sectors but are not internationally mobile. 
 There is no price discrimination; therefore the home price of a good equals its export 
price. 
 All types of firms produce under the same marginal cost; therefore the prices of all goods 
produced in one country have the same price in equilibrium. 
 There exist three different configurations of firms. Domestic (type-d) firms have 
headquarters and single plant in one country. They serve foreign markets by exports. 
Vertical or type-v firms have a headquarters and a single plant in different countries. 
These type of firms tend to locate high-skilled labour intensive headquarter services in the 
skilled-labour abundant host country. The production of the plant abroad is endogenously 
divided between the supply of the local market and the shipment back to the home 
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country. Horizontal or type-h firms refer to two-plant firms with a headquarters in one 
country and one of the plants in the other country. The production of type-h in a foreign 
(host) country is used entirely to supply the local foreign market. 
 Fragmentation: knowledge-based assets and knowledge-generating activities might be 
located separately from production. The incremental costs of supplying asset’s services 
to a foreign plant relative to the cost of supplying the services to a domestic plant are 
small. Fragmentation is not perfect, i.e. technology transfer incurs some costs. This can be 
expressed as: 
(3.1)                                                                                                        divjvihjhi FFFFF >+>+
 
where Fi are fixed costs incurred in the home country in units of skilled labour and Fj is fixed 
costs incurred in the foreign country in units of skilled labour 
 Skilled-labour intensity: knowledge-based assets are skilled-labour intensive with respect 
to final production. 
 The fragmentation and skilled labour intensity imply that knowledge based assets are 
located where skilled labour is at low cost and production is located where unskilled 
labour is at low cost. These give rise to vertical MNE. 
 Jointness: the services of knowledge-based assets are at least partially joint inputs into 
multiple production facilities, i.e. they can be used simultaneously in more locations 
without reducing the services in any single location. The added cost to establish a second 
plant is small compared to the cost of setting up a company with a local plant, i.e. there 
are scale economies at firm level. Jointness implies production in different geographical 
locations and gives rise to horizontal MNE. 
 The level of skilled-labour intensity in headquarters activities is higher than in production 
plants, including both plant-specific fixed and marginal costs. The level of skilled-labour 
intensity of a plant alone, without a headquarters, is higher than of the composite Y 
sector.2 The level of skilled-labour intensity in two-plant type-h firms is higher than in 
a single-plant type-d or type-h firms. There are both firm-level and plant-level scale 
                                                 
2
 This assumption holds especially in developing countries, where branch plants of foreign multinationals might 
be more skilled-labour intensive than the whole economy. 
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economies, i.e. two-plant multinationals (type-h) have higher fixed costs than a single 
plant firm, but not twice as high. This can be expressed as: 
(3.2)                                                                                                          2 dihihjhidi FFFFF >>+>
 
 One-plant type-d firms incur all the fixed costs in one country; one-plant type-v firms 
incur their fixed costs in both the headquarters country and in the plant-located country; 
two-plant type-h firms incur most of the fixed costs in the headquarters country. 
 Headquarters activities are only skilled labour intensive, whereas integrated headquarters 
and plant activities (relevant for type-h firm) are both skilled and unskilled labour 
intensive.  
 The production function of Y in country i (j) is a CES function, identical in both countries: 
[ ]
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 where Siy and Liy are the skilled and unskilled labour used in the Y sector of country i;  
0 < α < 1 is a share parameter that determines the degree of substitubility of the factors and    
(1/(1- α)) is the elasticity of substitution. 
 Type-d firms undertake all their production in the home country and thus incur all costs in 
one country. The cost function of a national firm in country i is given by: 
(3.5)                                                              ][            FsGτ)X(ccXlSsLl diidijdiiidiidii ++++=+
 
where ii sl , stands for price of unskilled and skilled labour ii SL , ; G is the fixed costs incurred 
in units of unskilled labour and remains the same for any plant regardless of firm type and 
country; c is marginal cost of X production in units of skilled labour and τ  is transport cost 
for X in units of skilled labour (the same for both directions); dijX denotes sales in country j of 
a national firm based in country i. 
 A type-h firm operates one plant in each country incurring fixed costs in both home and 
foreign countries. The cost function of a horizontal firm headquartered in country i is as 
follows: 
(3.6)                                 ][][ hjjhiihijjhiiihijjhiiihijjhiii FsFsGcXlGcXlSsSsLlLl +++++=+++
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 A type-v firm operates a plant abroad and has sales in both countries. Thus, a vertical 
multinational headquartered in country i has a cost function: 
(3.7)                                                  ])([ vjjviiviivijjvijjviiivijj FsFsGXccXlSsSsLl +++++=++ τ
 
3.2.2 Model Equilibrium 
Given the cost functions in the sectors and the production function of the homogeneous 
sector Y, the equilibrium in the KC model is given by the market clearing conditions (determining 
the factor prices and the goods prices), national income condition, and equilibrium in the sector Y 
and equilibrium in the sector X. The equilibrium conditions in sector X are of vital importance, 
since they enable to define patterns of multinationals activities under different variables settings. 
 
National income balance 
In equilibrium, the firms obtain the income only from the sale of factors, since they make no 
profit, therefore the national income in countries i and j is given by the total national factor 
endowment: 
(3.9)                                                                                                                            
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where )(),( **** jiji LLSS are the total factor endowments of skilled and unskilled labour in country i 
and j. 
 
Market clearing conditions 
i. Factor prices 
The constraints on labor supply (factor market clearing condition) is given by total factor 
endowment in country i and j, **** ,,, jjii SLSL : 
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where ),,(,, vjhjdjvihidi NNNNNN indicate the number of active type-d, type-h and type-v firms 
headquartered in country i (j). 
 
ii. Goods prices 
According to the assumption, the utility of the representative consumer in each country is 
given by the Cobb-Douglas function: 
(3.14)                                                                                                                                 1 ββ −= icici YXU
where: 
(3.15)                                                        vjivjviivihjihjhiihidjidjdiidiic XNXNXNXNXNXNX +++++=
is the aggregate consumption of X in country i and j; diN  is the number of type-d firms 
headquartered in country i that is active in equilibrium and Yic denotes the consumption of 
homogenous product Y in country i. The utility in country j is defined analogously. 
In equilibrium, the consumers demand such a quantity of X and Y, so they maximize their 
utility, subject to the income constraint given in equations (3.8) and (3.9). The first order 
conditions of the Cobb-Douglas utility function gives following demands for X and Y3: 
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pi, pj denote the price of X produced in country i (j). 
 
Equilibrium in sector Y is given by the zero profit condition, where marginal costs equal 
marginal price: 
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where yip  denotes the marginal price of product Y in countries i and ),( iiyi slc is the constant 
marginal production cost in country i.  
 
Equilibrium in sector X: 
Since the equilibrium in sector X is given by many unknowns and equations, the authors used 
the mathematical programming to model it. In particular, they employed the complementary 
slackness method, where each nonnegative (continuous) variable is associated with one 
inequality. A complementary variable is positive if inequality holds with equality, and it is zero 
otherwise. 
The sector X produces under Cournot competition. Thus, in equilibrium: 
 The output of X is determined by the pricing inequalities (marginal revenues ≤ marginal 
costs) 
 The number of type-d and type-v firms are given by the free entry inequality (zero-profit 
condition, where markup revenues ≤ fixed costs) 
 
i. Pricing inequalities 
In Cournot equilibrium, the output per firm is constant and is given as a function of 
the mark-up over marginal cost. An optimal mark-up is determined as the ratio between 
the firm’s market share and the price elasticity of demand in the market. 
 34 
 
The first order condition of the profit maximization ( 0=∂∂ xxpi ) yields a unique 
equilibrium, which can be expressed as follows4: 
(3.22)                                                                                                     ')1(
'
cmp
m
n
n
p
cp
i
i
=−







=
=
−
η
η
where p is the price of the product X, c
 
denotes the marginal costs of X, ni is the firm’s market 
share, η is the elasticity of demand ( '/ QPp−=η ) and m is the markup over marginal costs in 
the equilibrium. 
Applying the pricing equation (3.22) to the KC model, we get six pricing inequalities, stating 
the output of X for all firms type headquartered in country i: 
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are markups over marginal costs in the equilibrium and equal type-d, type-h and type-v firm’s 
market shares in countries i and j, since utility is given by a Cobb-Douglas function 
homogeneous of degree one and the price elasticity of demand is 1. The pricing inequalities for 
firms headquartered in country j are defined similarly. By substituting markups in the pricing 
inequalities, we obtain the outputs for X produced in country i: 
                                                 
4
 For more details on the Cournot model see e.g. Vives (2000, chapter 4). 
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Analogous inequalities hold for goods produced in country j. 
 
ii. Free entry condition 
 
The free market entry condition is given by zero profit conditions stating the number of each 
type of firms in equilibrium. This can be expressed as the requirement that markup revenues are 
less than or equal fixed costs5: 
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If the outputs are positive, then (3.31) and (3.32) hold with equality and substituting them into 
(3.33) – (3.38) yields following quadratic inequalities stating the profit of each type of firms in 
equilibrium: 
                                                 
5
 Monopolistic competition literature quite often makes an assumption of the number of firms to be a 
continuous variable. This assumption was used by the authors as well in this model, when they put a free entry 
inequality restricting the profit to nonnegative values to be a complement to a continuous variable stating the number 
of firms active in equilibrium. 
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Each of the inequality (3.39) – (3.43) holds with equality if a firm type is active in 
equilibrium, and holds with inequality otherwise.  
From (3.39) – (3.43) it can be seen that type-h firms have higher markup revenues than type-
d or type-v firms, since the latter bear transport costs but at the same time, type-h firms have 
higher fixed costs than type-d and type-v firms. 
When factor prices are different in two countries with similar sizes, single plant firms (either 
type-d or type-v firms) have a comparative advantage over the horizontal multinationals, since 
they draw the factor of production only from one country and thus can locate single plant in the 
low cost country, whereas horizontal multinationals draw factors of production from both 
countries and thus they have to incur high costs to locate a plant in the high cost country. 
Similarly, larger market favors again single plant firms, since they incur only trade costs on 
relatively small amount of output exported to the small market abroad. On the other hand, 
horizontal multinationals would have to incur high costs to install the production capacities.  
An increase in total world income will increase the multinationals’ profitability relative to 
profitability of national firms due to transport costs and is associated with the switch from high 
variable costs export to high fixed costs foreign plant, increasing the number of type-h firms. 
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When single plant firms dominate, the question of type-d versus type-v firms depends on 
factor price equalization reasoning, but not much on the market sizes effects. If factor prices 
differences are enough sufficient to outweigh any fragmentation costs, than a type-v firm 
headquartered in the skilled labour abundant country has lower fixed costs than a type-d firm 
headquartered in the other country, since fixed costs are assumed to be skilled labour intensive 
relative to homogenous product Y. 
The type-v firm is most likely to emerge when the home country is small and skilled labour 
abundant. These stems from the fact that the fixed costs at firm level that give rise to multi plant 
economies of scale are relatively skilled labour intensive and are mainly incurred in 
the headquarters, therefore it pays to locate the headquarters in a skilled labour abundant country 
in order to exploit price factor differences. On the other hand, the location of a single plant 
depends predominantly on the market size. The bigger the local market, the more output is used 
to serve the local market, reducing the aggregate transport costs. 
 
3.2.3 Simulation Results 
 
Due to the endogeneity of variables and complexity of the model, the comparative statics is 
of limited use here. Instead, Markusen et al. (1996) and Markusen (1997, 2002) used special 
software solver, Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium (MPS/GE), to 
calibrate the KC model with different values of parameters in order to obtain equilibrium regimes 
(i.e. types of firms active in equilibrium). 
The authors calibrated the knowledge-capital model for both the number of multinational 
types active in equilibrium and the affiliate production in equilibrium. Representative simulation 
results are demonstrated with a series of world Edgeworth box diagrams. Here, I will limit 
the discussion on the simulation results for the affiliate production6, since all testable predictions 
are derived from this. 
Figures 1 presents simulation results on world affiliate production with moderate transport 
costs: 
 
                                                 
6
 The term affiliate production, affiliate sales and FDI are used interchangeably. 
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Figure 1: Volume of Affiliate Production under Moderate Transport Costs 
  
 
Source: Markusen (2002, p. 146) 
 
Figure 1 represents world Edgeworth box that indexes the world endowment of factors of 
production with the world endowment of skilled labour on one axis of the base and the composite 
(unskilled labour) on another axis of the base. The vertical axis measures the real volume of 
affiliate production of plants in country j of multinationals headquartered in country i (horizontal 
or vertical type) and vice versa. The total world endowments and size are held constant and any 
point within the box is a division between the countries i and j, with country i measured from the 
southwest corner and country j from the northeast corner. The countries have the same relative 
factor endowments but differ in size on the Southwest – Northeast diagonal. Above the diagonal, 
the home country (country i) is skilled labour abundant relative to the host country (country j). 
The approximate locus of equal incomes for the two countries lays on a line which is steeper than 
Northwest – Southeast diagonal and runs from approximately cell row 0.95/ column 0.30 
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southeasterly to the cell row 0.05/ column 0.70. The relative economic size of the country i grows 
along the diagonal from Southwest to Northeast.  
Simulation of the affiliate sales in Figure 1 clearly indicates the nonlinearities in 
the knowledge-capital model. For instance, the effect of the differences in country size on 
affiliate size depends on the countries’ relative endowments and vice versa. 
Figure 1 shows that affiliate production follows an inverted U-shaped curve along the 
Southwest-Northeast diagonal. The total affiliate production is maximized in the midpoint of the 
SW-NE diagonal (in the centre area of the Edgeworth box), where both countries are identical in 
sizes and have similar relative endowments. Here, all firms are horizontal and half of the world 
output of good X is produced by affiliate plants and other half is produced by domestic plants of 
the horizontal multinationals. The affiliate production decreases towards either SW or NE corner, 
where the countries remain similar in relative endowments but differ in size. In this case, the 
national firms located in the large country will have the advantages as noted in previous section. 
The inverted U-shape of the horizontal affiliate sales can be better seen in Figure 2, which plots 
simulation results for affiliate sales along the SW-NE diagonal of the Edgeworth box, where 
countries have similar relative endowments but differ in sizes. 
 
Figure 2: Volume of Affiliate Production along the Southwest-Northeast Diagonal 
 
Source: Markusen (2002, p. 149) 
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VAS is the total volume of affiliate sales, VASIJ is the volume of affiliate sales of horizontal 
MNEs in country j with headquarters in country i and VASJI is similarly defined. Figure 2 reveals 
the non-monotonic characters of affiliate sales for the individual countries, with highest affiliate 
sales when the home country is moderately small ceteris paribus. 
Coming back to Figure 1, it can be seen that the total affiliate production is highest in 
the Northwest and Southeast areas of the Edgeworth box, where one country is both moderately 
small and skilled labour abundant. Here, most multinationals are vertical headquartered in 
the small, skilled labour abundant country with plants located in the larger, unskilled labour 
abundant countries. This implies that if only vertical multinationals are active in equilibrium, 
then all the world output of good X is produced by affiliate plants. Figure 3 plots the affiliate 
sales along the approximate equal income (country sizes) locus Northwest – Southeast. 
 
Figure 3: Volume of Affiliate Production along the Equal Income Locus Northwest - 
Southeast  
 
Source: Markusen (2002, p. 150) 
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Figure 3 shows the inverted U-shaped character of affiliate sales when countries are equally 
large but differ in relative endowments. Here, the affiliate production is highest when                 
the difference in relative endowments is rather moderate than extreme. 
 
Figure 4: One Directional Affiliate Production by Country i Firms in Country j 
 
Source: Markusen (2002, p. 148) 
 
The fact that the affiliate production for both vertical and horizontal MNEs is highest when 
the headquarters are based in a moderately small and skilled abundant country can be well seen 
on Figure 4, which plots the affiliate sales in one direction only (i.e. affiliate production in 
country j of MNEs headquartered in country i). 
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3.3 Third Country Effects 
 
3.3.1 Channels of Third Country Effects Transmission 
 
For the empirical specification of the third country effects in my analysis, the study of 
Blonigen et al. (2005) is of special relevance, since it is to my knowledge the only study which 
deals with the inward FDI data. Other studies all focused on third country effects on outward FDI 
data. Blonigen et al. (2005) identified two potential channels through which third countries may 
affect FDI into a host country in a simple theoretical model of MNEs. The first channel refers to 
the parent market proximity effect (analogous to market potential for outbound FDI), i.e. to what 
extent the parent’s country’s proximity to other countries (markets) affect the parent’s decision 
whether to service the host market through exports or through FDI. The second channel refers to 
the influence of the multinationals presented in a host country on each other (e.g. through positive 
spill-overs, agglomeration effects or crowding out effect). 
A proxy for parent market proximity was constructed by Blonigen et al. (2005) in 
an analogous way as the market potential variable for outward data, i.e. as a distance weighted 
sums of third countries’ GDP. However, whilst the market potential measures the host market 
proximity to additional surrounding countries, the parent market proximity measures                 
the proximity of the parent country to other parent countries. Thus, this variable measures 
the ease with which a parent country can export from its home base.  
From its definition, it is clear that the parent market proximity captures the effects of pure 
vertical FDI only. Thus, by including this variable, more complex form of FDI, such as export 
platform or complex vertical FDI are ruled out by assumption. This was not restrictive in the case 
of Blonigen et al. (2005), as they studied the U.S. inbound FDI. The U.S.A., due to their 
geographical position and country characteristics, are not likely to serve as export platform or to 
become one of the chains in complex vertical FDI. 
Nonetheless, this is not true for the Czech Republic and therefore I will also include            
the market potential variable in the regression equation to capture more complex type of MNE’s 
activities. 
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I will discuss these variables more later on in the empirical model specification, as 
the construction of their proxies is not technically difficult and their effect on inward FDI is 
rather straightforward. 
The second channel through which third country may affect the FDI decisions is 
the influence of concurrent FDI from other parent countries on the MNE’s production costs in    
the host country. This effect can be captured by spatial linkage, specifically by spatial lag model. 
Indeed, spatial lag is similar to time series autocorrelation, in which the dependent variable in one 
period is influenced by the dependent variable in previous period. However, unlike time series 
autocorrelation, spatial lag enables to assign the weights to variables of interest and thus provides 
a better specification of the interactions. For instance, countries that are likely to influence each 
other more (e.g. due to their proximity) are assigned with a larger weight and vice versa. 
Since spatial interactions are not commonly used techniques in FDI estimation, it might be 
useful to briefly present the econometric mechanism behind before discussing the empirical 
specification of the spatial lag for inward FDI. 
3.3.2 Spatial Dependence 
 
When sample data have a locational component, two potential problems may arise that 
violate the Gauss-Markov assumptions of the regression models. Firstly, locational components 
may induce spatial dependence, i.e. sample data observed at one point in space may depend on 
values observed at other location. Secondly, there may be a spatial heterogeneity that refers to 
variation in relationships over space, i.e. for every observation made, a different relationship may 
hold due to the variance in either functional forms or the parameters. 
The problem of spatial heterogeneity does not appear to be relevant for the case of FDI, 
therefore I will not discuss this issue further and will instead focus on the spatial dependence 
problem. 
In spatial econometrics, spatial dependence can take two forms – as a spatially lagged 
dependent variable (Wy) or in the error structure (E[εiεj]≠0). The former is referred to as a spatial 
lag or spatial autoregressive model and the later is referred to as spatial error or spatial 
autocorrelation model. 
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The spatial lag model is appropriate for the assessment of the existence and strength of 
spatial interaction and takes a similar form as autoregressive time series model. The formal 
spatial lag regression model can be expressed as: 
 
(3.44)                                                                                                                     εβρ ++= XWyy
 
where y is n elements vector of dependent variable, ρ is a spatial autoregressive coefficient 
( [ ]1;1−∈ρ ), W is an nn ×  contiguity or spatial weights matrix, X is kn ×  matrix of explanatory 
variables, β is k element vector of coefficients and ε is an n element error terms vector. 
A contiguity or spatial weights matrix is a fixed (non-stochastic) and positive matrix, that 
specifies for each location i (as the row) the neighbours (as the columns) corresponding to non-
zero elements ijw : 
∑
=
=
Nj jiji ywWy ,..,1 (3.45)                                                                                                                 ][
 
The elements are row standardized in matrix W, such that for i, ∑ =j ijw 1and by convention, 
0=iiw , i.e. a location is never a neighbour of itself. The spatial matrix may be interpreted as 
a weighted average of the neighbours, with ijw  being the weights that are exogenous to             
the model. There is a quite wide range of spatial weights specification, for instance, weights can 
be based on whether two locations share a common border (Coughlin and Segev 2000), on 
distance decay (i.e. inverse distance or inverse distance squared) (Blonigen et al. 2007, Garretsen 
and Peeters 2008), on the structure of a social network, on economic distance, or on trade based 
interaction measures (Anselin 1999) etc. Despite a wide variety of possible spatial weights 
specifications, weights derived from contiguity or geographical arrangements are most widely 
used, since their exogeneity is unambiguous.  
If the spatial lag is significant in equation (3.44), then ignoring spatial effects means that     
an explanatory variable has been omitted and the estimates of β are biased and statistical 
inferences are invalid. 
The second form of spatial dependence is the spatial dependence in the regression 
disturbance term, referred to as spatial error or spatial autocorrelation. This model is appropriate 
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when the intention is to correct for potentially biasing influence of spatial autocorrelation due to 
the use of spatial data. The model can be formally expressed as 
(3.46)                                                                                                                                 εβ += Xy
where 
(3.47)                                                                                                                               µελε += W
 
λ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient, [ ]1;1−∈λ , µ is n by 1 vector of error terms and other 
notation is as before. The variable λ measures the degree of spill-over of the shocks in 
neighbouring locations on the dependent variable through the disturbance term. If the spatial 
autocorrelation is ignored, then the statistical inferences are invalid, nonetheless, unlike 
the spatial lag, the estimates remain unbiased. 
 
3.3.3 Spatial Lag Specification for inward FDI 
 
Since my primary interest is to test for the existence and strength of spatial interactions in 
the inward FDI, I will follow the approach of Blonigen et al. (2005), leave out spatial 
autocorrelation and focus solely on spatial lag testing. 
As mentioned above, the spatial lag can be represented by a term FDIW  . . ρ , where ρ  is 
spatial autoregressive (spatial lag) coefficient, measuring the strength and sign of spatial 
relationship in FDI; W is the n by n spatial lag weighting matrix, which is row standardized, 
block-diagonal with each block capturing a single year’s observations and FDI is the vector of 
foreign direct investment into the Czech Republic. Thus, the term W. FDI can be interpreted as 
a proximity-weighted average of FDI from alternative countries into a host country. For any year 
]2008,2003[∈t , tW can be defined as: 
(3.48)                                                                                        
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where )(
, jit dw  is a functional form of the weights between any two pair of parent countries i and 
j. I will follow the same convention as in Blonigen et al. (2005, 2007), Baltagi et al. (2007)       
and Garretsen et Peeters (2008) and choose a simple inverse distance function as a weight, where 
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the shortest distance within the sample (i.e. 174 kilometres between Brussels and Amsterdam) 
gets the weight of unity and all other distances within a sample a weight that declines with 
distance, i.e. jiddw jiji ≠∀= ,
174)(
,
,
, with jid , being the air distance between any two parent 
countries’ capitals. As distance is time-invariant, it follows that 200820042003 WWW == . Thus, the 
full spatial weight matrix will take the form: 
(3.49)                                                                                                             
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As noted earlier, a spatial lag measures the impact of concurrent FDI from other countries on 
the FDI from the parent country in question. If ρ is negative, then it indicates a crowding out 
effect of third countries FDI, i.e. the increase in other multinationals activities in a host country 
will increase the marginal costs of the MNE from the parent country in question. On the other 
hand, a positive spatial lag signalizes the spill-over effects, i.e. more FDI from other countries 
may lower the marginal costs of host production due to spill-overs. Nonetheless, a spatial lag 
coefficient is capable of capturing the net effect third country FDI, i.e. both mechanisms can 
coexist. 
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3.3 Summary 
 
This chapter described the theoretical background for the empirical model specification, 
namely the knowledge-capital model and the model with third country effects. In the first part 
of the chapter, I presented the knowledge-capital model, its assumptions, equilibrium 
conditions and simulation results. Given the assumptions, the equilibrium in the knowledge 
model was attained when four conditions were fulfilled: the market clearing conditions,       
the national income condition and the equilibrium conditions in sector Y and X. As the model 
had many endogenous variables, the authors used the complementary slackness form to state 
the equilibrium conditions in sector X and applied mathematical programming to solve         
the model. 
The simulation results, in particular the Edgeworth boxes, have proven as a useful tool to 
envisage the conditions under which different patterns of internalization emerge. The results 
revealed that the total affiliate production of horizontal multinationals follows an inverted U-
shaped curve and reaches the peak when the both parent and host are similar in size and 
skilled labour endowment. Nonetheless, the affiliate production of individual countries has 
a non-monotonic character, with highest affiliate production when both parent and host have 
similar skilled labour endowment but the parent is moderately small. 
With respect to vertical multinationals, the simulation results indicated highest total 
affiliate production in the Northwest and Southeast area of the Edgeworth box, where 
the home country is both moderately small and skilled labour abundant. However, even 
though vertical affiliate production is driven by the differences in relative factor endowment, 
it tends to be higher when the differences are rather moderate than extreme. 
 In the second part of the chapter I focused on the third country effects for inbound FDI 
data and discussed the two channels through which third countries may affect inbound FDI: 
the parent and host market proximity and the influence of concurrent FDI in the host country 
on each other. The effect of market proximity variables is rather straightforward; therefore I 
postponed the discussion of the impact of these variables to the next chapter, where empirical 
models will be specified. Instead, I aimed at discussing the spatial interactions, which capture 
the impact of concurrent FDI in the host country on each other. This effect can be proxied by 
a spatial lag variable, with a negative spatial lag coefficient indicating crowding out effects of 
third country FDI and a positive spatial lag coefficient signalling positive spill-over effect. 
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4 
Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the research methodology and specifies the empirical models to be 
tested. In the first section, I define the empirical specifications for two empirical regression 
models. The first, baseline model aims at investigating whether the multinationals invest into 
the Czech Republic for the purpose of exploiting the factor price differences or to gain 
the access to the foreign markets. In order to do so, I employ the empirical specification of 
the knowledge-capital model based on Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2002a), 
since these specifications were driven from the formal theory of the knowledge-capital model 
and are probably the most frequently employed ones in studies of the knowledge-capital 
model. The second model aims at testing the effect of third countries on multinationals’ 
activities in the Czech Republic. The empirical specification of the model is in line with 
Blonigen et al. (2005, 2007) and Garretsen et Peeters (2008) and represents a combination of 
parent country gravity variables and third country effects variables.  
Following the empirical specification, in the next section I derive 11 testable hypotheses, 
stating the expected effect of each independent variable on affiliate sales (FDI stock). 
In the last section, I introduce the sources the data were collected from, the level of data 
aggregation and the econometric methods to be applied.   
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4.2 Empirical Model Specification 
4.2.1 The Baseline Model 
 
Following Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2002a), the knowledge-capital 
empirical specification (Model 1) can be expressed as follows: 
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In Model 1, sub-index i denotes a parent (home country), whilst sub-index j refers to 
the host country, which is in all cases the Czech Republic. The parent (home) country is 
defined as the country where the headquarters of multinationals are located. For the list of 
parent countries refer to Appendix 1. The host country is defined as the country where 
affiliates of multinationals are located. 
The dependent variable ijtSales is the volume of affiliate sales in thousand Euros 
and represents a proxy for the activity of affiliates of MNEs. I have decided to use this 
measure since it is a direct measure of MNE’s foreign activity and also for consistency 
reasons, as the theory generates testable predictions on affiliate sales. I also include a second 
measure of FDI stocks to verify the robustness of the results. 
The first two independent variables, 2, ijtijt SizeDiffSizeSum account for sum of real GDP 
in the parent and the host countries and the squared difference in real GDP between the parent 
and the host countries. According to the theory, these variables exert influence only 
on horizontal FDI, since vertical FDI are indifferent to the joint market size or the size 
difference between countries. The sum of real GDP is expected to have a positive sign, since 
it measures the size of the market (total demand). Carr et al. (2001) even posited a stronger 
hypothesis by assuming the elasticity of affiliate sales to the joint market size to be greater 
than one. The squared difference in the market size was introduced to capture the inverted U-
shape of horizontal affiliate sales along the SW-NE diagonal, with a peak when the countries 
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have identical market sizes (see Figure 2). Therefore, the expected sign of this variable 
is negative. 
The third variable ijtSkillDiff measures the skilled labour difference between the parent 
and the host countries ( jtitijt SkillSkillSkillDiff −= ). A positive sign of the variables 
indicates the presence of the vertical FDI, since the theory postulates that vertical MNEs tend 
to headquarter in a skilled labour abundance country. On the other hand, a negative sign 
provides an evidence for a horizontal component of the KC model, as this type of foreign 
activities is driven by similarities in skilled labour between the countries. 
The impact of ijtSizeDiff and ijtSkillDiff on affiliate sales can be assessed in more detail by 
using the partial derivates: 
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From (4.2) follows that when the countries have the same relative factor endowments, 
the marginal change of the affiliate sales on the size difference depends only on ijtSizeDiff22β . 
The theory predicts that when a host country is smaller, i.e. 0>ijtSizeDiff , the horizontal 
activity between the host and the parent will decrease due to the decline in economies of 
scale, whilst the fixed costs remain unchanged. The analogous explanation holds when         
the host country becomes bigger, i.e.  0<ijtSizeDiff . This confirms the negative expected 
sign of coefficient 2β that was discussed earlier. 
Equation (4.3) indicates that the overall effect of the skill difference on the affiliate sales 
depends on the skill difference itself, the market size difference the host country trade costs. 
When both countries have the same market size and the host country trade costs is zero, 
the expected sign of 3β follows the same logic as discussed above, i.e. a positive sign provides 
an evidence for vertical FDI and a negative sign provides an evidence for horizontal FDI.  
The coefficient 4β  accounts for the interaction term ijtijt SizeDiffSkillDiff , a product 
between the skilled labour difference and market size difference between the host and the 
parent country and captures vertical FDI. According to the knowledge-capital model, when 
a parent country is both large and skilled labour abundant, the affiliate export (sales) 
of vertical MNEs will drop due to the growth in trade costs. This implies that 
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when 0>ijtSkillDiff , the vertical FDI will diminish the bigger the parent country will become. 
Indeed, the knowledge-capital model predicts highest vertical FDI when the parent country 
is moderately small and skilled labour abundant. These suggest a negative sign for 
the coefficient 4β . 
The other two variables, jtit TradeCostTradeCost , account for the trade costs in the parent 
and the host countries. The marginal effect of host country trade costs on affiliate sales is 
given by 
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From (4.4.) it follows that the host country trade costs affect the affiliate sales directly per 
se, and indirectly, via the interaction with squared skilled labour difference. A positive sign 
for the coefficient 6β provides support for horizontal FDI, since higher trade costs make 
exports an unattractive option. The coefficient 8β of the interaction term also captures 
the horizontal FDI. Carr et al. (2001) assumed a negative sign on this variable, since 
difference in relative skilled labour endowment reduces the horizontal FDI and thus decreases 
the positive effect of host country trade costs on the horizontal FDI. Nevertheless, Carr et al. 
(2001) marked this hypothesis as a weak one, since the effect of host country trade costs on 
affiliate sales is not symmetric around the SW-NE diagonal but it is highest when the parent 
country is moderately skilled labour abundant. 
The parent trade costs are expected to discourage vertical FDI in favour of horizontal FDI 
due to higher costs of shipping the goods from the host country back to the parent country. 
The simulation results of the change in trade costs on affiliate production also reveals 
nonlinearities between the parent trade costs and skilled labour differences. However, this 
interaction term is not included in the model as Carr et al. (2001) noted a high collinearity 
between the interaction term and skilled labour difference variable. 
 
4.2.2 The Spatial lag Model 
 
As noted in the introduction, the spatial lag model aims at testing the existence 
and strengths of third country effects on inward FDI. To meet this objective, it is not 
appropriate to include the third country effects into the knowledge-capital model, since 
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the KC model was drawn upon a theoretical background and addresses only a specific set 
of variables. Instead, I employ an empirical specification of Blonigen et al. (2005), as they 
tested the third country effects for inbound FDI. In their model, the authors included a set 
of commonly used parent gravity variables and a quadratic time trend to capture the tendency 
of affiliate sales (FDI stocks) to grow over time. No host country variables were included 
since the Czech Republic was in all cases the only host country and the host country variables 
turned insignificant once a time trend was included. Thus, the spatial lag model (Model 2) 
takes the form as follows:  
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In Model 2, itPopulation  denotes a population of parent country i in year t, itGDP stands 
for parent’s country i real GDP in year t, itSkill for parent’s i skilled labour endowment in year 
t, itTradeCosts denotes parent’s i trade costs in year t, ijceDis tan measures the distance 
between the capital cities of parent i and the Czech Republic. All these variables but 
Population are defined in the same way as in Model 1. Lastly, Trend and 2Trend stand for 
linear and quadratic time trend over the years 2003-2008. 
As my aim is to determine the relevance and influence of the third country variables on 
MNE’s activities and to test for impact of gravity variables, I will discuss the gravity variables 
possible influence and direction of their impact on affiliate sales and will restrict my 
discussion solely on the third country effects. 
The coefficient 8β measures the effect of parent country’s proximity to non-host markets. 
The construction of this variable is taken from Blonigen et al. (2005), who found that 
the distance weighted sum of adjacent countries’ GDPs as a measure for market proximity has 
the best fit for the data. The parent market proximity for parent i is defined as: 
(4.6)                                                                    174Pr ktki ikit GDPdoximityetParentMark ∑ ≠=
where ikd is the distance between the parent country i and another parent country k in the 
sample (refer to Appendix 1 for the list of parent countries); 174 kilometres is the shortest air 
distance between the pair of parent countries in the sample (Brussels and Amsterdam) 
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and ktGDP  is the real GDP of parent country k in time t.Thus, this variable measures the ease 
with which a parent country can export from its home base and provides evidence for vertical 
FDI. The expected sign of parent market proximity is positive. 
The next variable, host market proximity (market potential), captures the effect of export 
platform FDI (a complex form of horizontal FDI) and is constructed in line with Baltagi et al. 
(2005), Blonigen et al. (2007) and Garretsen and Peeters (2008). Host market proximity for 
host country j is defined as: 
(4.7)                                                                     252Pr ltlj jljt GDPdoximityHostMarket ∑ ≠= , 
where jld  is the distance between the Czech Republic and another adjacent country k  
(an adjacent country is a Central and Eastern European country being a member of the 
European Union); 252 kilometres is the shortest air distance in the sample (between Prague 
and Vienna) and ltGDP is real GDP of host country l in time t.   
This variable captures the export platform FDI, since this type of investment is motivated 
by the size of proximate markets it may serve by exporting from the host country in question. 
In addition, it may also be relevant for complex vertical FDI, where multinationals fragment 
production activities and locate them in several geographic regions. This type of multinational 
activity is driven by the availability of low cost vertical suppliers. Therefore, if two adjacent 
host countries have similar supply network characteristics, the multinationals may find it 
profitable to set up part of the production chain in both countries, leading to a geographical 
clustering of complex vertical FDI. Blonigen et al. (2007) argued that the level of 
geographical clustering of FDI is highly correlated with host market proximity and hence host 
market proximity can proxy for both variables. Therefore, if host market proximity captures 
geographical clustering effect, the expected sign would be positive. 
The last variable is a spatial lag that measures the impact of concurrent FDI from other 
parent countries on FDI from the parent country in question. ρ is a spatial lag coefficient, W 
is a spatial weight matrix, taking a form as defined in Chapter 3 and ijtSales is the volume of 
affiliate sales in the Czech Republic in thousand Euros. A positive spatial lag coefficient 
ρ indicates spill-over effects whereas negative ρ infers crowding out effect (as discussed in 
the previous chapter). 
In order to test for the significance of the third country effects, I will test the robustness 
of the results of Model 2 when excluding the third country variables and when including these 
variables. 
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Summary of expected signs of independent variable in Model 1 and Model 2 (excluding 
gravity variables) is exhibited in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Expected Signs of Independent Variables 
Model 1 
Variable Horizontal FDI Vertical FDI 
ijtSizeSum  (+) 0 
2
ijtSizeDiff  (-) 0 
ijtSkillDiff  (-) (+) 
ijtijt SizeDiffSkillDiff  0 (-) 
itTradeCost  (+) (-) 
jtTradeCost  (+) 0 
2
ijtjt SkillDiffTradeCost  (-) 0 
ijDist  (+)/(-) (-) 
 
 
Model 2 
Variable Horizontal 
FDI 
Vertical FDI Export Platform 
FDI 
Complex 
Vertical FDI 
itoximityetParentMark Pr  0 (+) 0 0 
jtoximityHostMarket Pr  0 0 (+) (+)/0 
 
4.2.2 Hypotheses Construction 
 
The empirical specifications outlined above generate testable hypotheses. 
These hypotheses are formulated below, with null hypothesis stating no relationship between 
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two variables. The independent variable relevant for the hypothesis testing is stated in 
parentheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: A bilateral increase in parent and host country incomes (GDPs) increases sales 
of affiliates of parent country horizontal firms.      ( ijtSizeSum ) 
Hypothesis 2: A convergence in income (GDP) between host and parent country increases 
sales of affiliates of parent country horizontal firms.     ( 2ijtSizeDiff ) 
Hypothesis 3: A convergence in skilled labour endowment between host and parent country 
increases sales of affiliates of parent country horizontal firms whereas a divergence in skilled 
labour endowment between host and parent country increases sales of affiliates of parent 
country vertical firms.         ( ijtSkillDiff ) 
Hypothesis 4: Parent country vertical affiliate sales are highest when parent country is both 
moderately small and skilled labour abundant.            ( ijtijt SizeDiffSkillDiff ) 
Hypothesis 5: An increase in parent country trade costs decreases sales of affiliates of parent 
country vertical firms in favour of parent country horizontal firms.           ( itTradeCost ) 
Hypothesis 6: An increase in host country trade costs increases sales of affiliates of parent 
country horizontal firms.                 ( jtTradeCost ) 
Hypothesis 7: Bilateral increase in host country trade costs and skilled labour difference 
between host and parent countries reduces sales of affiliates of parent country horizontal 
firms.               ( 2ijtjt SkillDiffTradeCost ) 
Hypothesis 8: Exclusion of variable capturing third country effects leads to omitted variable 
bias of the results. 
Hypothesis 9: Parent proximity to third-country markets increases sales of affiliates of parent 
country vertical firms.      ( itoximityetParentMark Pr ) 
Hypothesis 10: Host proximity to third-country markets increases sales of affiliates of parent 
country export platform firms and of complex vertical firms.    ( jtoximityHostMarket Pr ) 
Hypothesis 11: Presence of other FDI in host country may crowd out further FDI or induce 
positive externalities in host country.        ( ijtSales.W ) 
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4.3 Data Sources and Data Estimation Approach 
4.3.1 Data Sources  
In my data set, I use the panel annual data on affiliate sales and FDI stock of affiliates 
of foreign parent companies operating in the Czech Republic. The firm level data have been 
obtained from the commercial database Amadeus, collected by Bureau van Dijk. 
This database contains comprehensive financial information on over 14 million companies 
across Europe. For the purpose of my empirical analysis, I selected all foreign affiliates 
located in the Czech Republic, with foreign shareholder(s) owning at least 51% of 
the company. This selection criterion rendered a panel of 4 023 companies over a time span 
period from 2003 to 2008. However, as the data for more than half of companies in 
the selection were incomplete, the final panel of company data reduced to 1 466 companies. 
The data compiled from Amadeus contained following information on the companies: 
company name, affiliate sales, total assets, number of employees, shareholders origin 
and their percentage of ownership and affiliates and shareholders NACE Rev.2 sector 
classification. 
As already mentioned in previous section, I have decided to measure the MNEs activity 
via two proxies – affiliate sales and FDI stock. Affiliate sales are readily available for all 
companies from Amadeus in EUR thousands. As opposed to affiliate sales, data on FDI stock 
were not available on Amadeus, hence I computed them. OECD (1999) recommends FDI 
stock to be measured as the contribution of parent companies to their subsidiaries’ total assets. 
Based on this definition, I computed the FDI stock for the companies in the sample for 
a respective year as a product of a company’s total assets and the shareholder’s percentage 
of ownership. Unfortunately, the percentage of ownership is only available for the last year 
data and thus I had to make an assumption of invariant ownership structure over the period 
2003-2008. This assumption is not a strong one, as the probability of companies changing 
their ownership structure is rather low. However, due to this caveat, I will focus in               
the following chapter on the estimation results for affiliate sales and will report the results on 
FDI stock only for informative purpose. 
Both affiliate sales and FDI stocks are transformed in real value via year-on-year GDP 
deflator provided by the Czech Statistical Office. 
The independent variables are measured in line with Carr et al. (2001). Economic size 
of parent and host countries is proxied by real GDP in EUR millions, with 2000 as the base 
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year. The data are taken from Eurostat database. Skilled labour endowment is measured as 
a ratio of the sum of occupational categories 1 (legislators, senior officials and managers), 
2 (professionals) and 3 (technicians and associate professionals) to total employment. 
The data were collected from the database of International Labour Organization. 
Parent and host country trade costs were not proxied in the same way as Carr et al. (2001) 
due to the unavailability of data. Instead, I followed the approach of Gieshecker and Görg 
(2005) and Anghel (2007) and proxied the trade cost as the ratio of imports at CIF (i.e. at 
values including cost, insurance and freight) to export at FOB (free on board). The parent 
trade costs are then calculated as: 
(4.8)                                                                                        exp FOBjit
CIF
ijt
it ort
importTradeCost =
Analogically, host country trade costs are defined as: 
(4.9)                                                                                        exp FOBijt
CIF
jit
jt ort
importTradeCost =
The data on import and export were downloaded from the Direction of Trade Statistics 
database of International Monetary Fund. 
The data on population were compiled from OECD statistical database. 
Finally, distance is measured as a geographical distance between two countries capital 
cities in kilometres. The data were taken from Macalester College economic research website. 
Refer to Appendix 3 for the summary of variables definition and units of measurement. 
 
4.3.2 Data Estimation Approach   
 
Although the primary aim of this master thesis is to test the pattern of internalization 
at disaggregated firm level, I have decided to include empirical estimation of the data 
at different level of aggregation to comparison purposes. 
As for the knowledge-capital model, the regression analysis is run on data at three levels 
of aggregation. Firstly, I summed up the individual firm data from a given parent country to 
obtain affiliate sales and FDI stock aggregated on country-by-country basis. Secondly, I 
summed up individual firm data from a given parent country and from a given industry to 
obtain affiliate sales and FDI stock data per sector of activity at country level. Lastly, I sorted 
data at firm level per sector of activity. Initially, I also sorted the firm level data at country 
level but the regression specification tests diagnosed collinearity for skill difference, the 
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second interaction variable and the distance, therefore I decided not to carry a regression for 
this category. The regression is run for both affiliate sales and FDI stock data for all levels of 
aggregation. 
In order to determine the appropriate regression model, I ran the Breusch-Pagan test 
to verify the homoskedasticity of the data. The tests revealed heteroskedasticity for 
the majority of data. Even after the transformation of the data to logarithm, 
the heteroskedasticity was not removed. If the data are heteroskedastic, i.e. the variance of 
disturbances is not constant, the OLS estimation will still be unbiased and consistent, but will 
not be efficient any more. An alternative to OLS estimation for panel data in the presence 
of heteroskedasticity are Fixed effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE) models as they allow for 
heteroskedasticity across units. The FE model relaxes the assumption of constant regression 
function over time and space and the explanatory power of the model depends on the variation 
within the unit. The difference between the FE and RE models is that random effect model 
assumes no correlation between individual specific effects and independent variables, whereas 
fixed effects model assumes individual specific effects to be correlated with the independent 
variables. If the random effect holds, than the estimate is more efficient than the fixed effects 
model. However, the RE estimate is not consistent if the assumption fails to hold. 
In order to choose among RE and FE model, I ran a Hausman specification test that 
evaluated the significance of RE estimator versus FE estimator. The p-value for all cases was 
below 10% level, rejecting the null hypotheses of the significance of random effect model in 
favour of FE model. In addition, the F-test that all disturbances are jointly zero reported also 
small p-value below 10% with high F-values, indicating significant individual effects. 
An indisputable advantage of the use of FE model over the RE model is that FE estimator 
enables to control for unobserved heterogeneity of independent variables. As the Hausman 
and F-test were both in favour of the FE estimator, I will employ the FE estimator to test 
the knowledge-capital model. The data are tested in a data analysis and statistical software 
STATA, version 9.1. 
As for the third country effects, I aggregated the data at country level and sorted them per 
sector of activities. Such an aggregation represents a reasonable compromise between 
the aggregated and firm level data. The reason why I did not test for third country effects for 
firm level data was due to the complexity of computation of a spatial lag. The third country 
effects are tested via OLS and maximum likelihood estimator, in line with Blonigen et al. 
(2005, 2007), Baltagi et al. (2007) and Garretsen et Peeters (2008). Unlike the knowledge-
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capital model, the data for Model 2 do not suffer from heteroskedasticity after transforming 
them into natural logarithm and thus the OLS estimation can be employed without the loss of 
efficiency. The data will be again tested in statistical software STATA, version 9.1.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
  
In this chapter, I presented the research methodology to be pursued for the empirical 
testing of the data.  
In the first part, I defined two empirical estimation models. The first, baseline model was 
derived from the knowledge-capital theoretical model and aimed at disentangling the two 
motivation of the multinationals activity in the Czech Republic: the factor-price difference 
exploitation motive (vertical integration) and the market access motive (horizontal 
integration). This model stipulates effects of market size, skilled labour endowment and trade 
costs on affiliate sales (FDI stocks). The empirical specification of the model was adopted 
from Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2002a), since these specifications are 
the most widely used ones in the empirical studies of the knowledge-capital model.  
Following, I specified an spatial lag model to test the variables capturing possible third 
country effects. These variables concern parent market proximity, host market proximity 
and spatial lag. The empirical model was specified in the same way as Blonigen et al. (2005).  
Once the empirical models and variables were specified, I formulated 11 testable 
hypotheses stating the relationship between each independent variable and affiliate sales. 
These hypotheses were subject to empirical testing and the results are presented in 
the following chapter. 
In the following section, I introduced the sources the data were compiled from. The data 
on affiliate sales and FDI stocks were collected from Amadeus, a database containing detailed 
financial information on over 14 million companies across Europe. I selected data from 
the companies with foreign affiliate located in Czech Republic with ownership of at least 51% 
for the period from 2003 to 2008. Independent variables were taken from various sources. 
Lastly, I defined the econometric method that will be employed for testing of the models. 
The baseline model will be tested via fixed effects model, whereas the spatial lag model will 
be tested by the maximum likelihood method and ordinary least squared estimation.  
 
 . 
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5 
Research Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the estimation results of the knowledge-capital model (baseline 
model) and third country effects model (spatial lag model) on a panel of annual data on 
affiliate sales and FDI stock of affiliates of foreign parent companies in the Czech Republic 
for the period from 2003 to 2008. 
The chapter starts with the preliminary data analysis, giving some insights in patterns 
of internalization of multinationals in the Czech Republic.  
The empirical results are presented and interpreted in the following section. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the regression of the baseline model is run for three 
different levels of aggregation: country aggregation, sectoral aggregation per countries 
and sectoral aggregation at firm-level. The results were consistent across the sectoral 
aggregation per parent countries and per individual firms for a number of sectors. In overall, 
they indicate the presence of both horizontal and vertical motive, with the prevalence of either 
motive varying across the sectors and the levels of aggregation. The results of the alternative 
model turned out to be highly sensitive to geographical composition of the data and so did the 
omitted variable bias.  
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5.2 Preliminary Data Analysis 
 
Before carrying out the econometric analysis of the data, I found it would be helpful to 
provide some insight in the data via descriptive statistics. The geographical and sectoral 
composition of the data gives a rough idea about the patterns of internalization.  
Table 3 presents the geographical composition of the multinationals activities in 
the Czech Republic for four indicators: FDI stocks, affiliate sales, total number of employees 
and number of affiliates for 2008. The table revealed that over 80% of affiliate sales and FDI 
stocks come from the European Union countries, with Germany, Netherlands, Austria 
and France taking the top four positions.  
Table 3: Geographical Breakdown of the MNEs Activities in the Czech Republic, 2008 
Data 
Country
FDI stocks Affiliate 
sales
Employees Number 
of 
affiliates
FDI stocks Affiliate 
sales
Employees Number 
of 
affiliates
(EUR mn) (EUR mn) (thousands) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Total 87 781 5 919 284 337 702 1 466 100% 100% 100% 100%
Countries breakdown:
Germany 23 789 1 812 104 73 007 286 27% 31% 22% 20%
Netherlands 17 525 1 107 958 66 408 245 20% 19% 20% 17%
France 9 783 503 963 40 450 132 11% 9% 12% 9%
Austria 6 770 596 417 25 522 182 8% 10% 8% 12%
Great Britain 6 624 8 029 6 745 88 8% 0% 2% 6%
Japan 4 911 123 771 8 773 32 6% 2% 3% 2%
Switzerland 3 913 280 326 22 367 72 4% 5% 7% 5%
U.S.A. 3 731 166 073 18 046 112 4% 3% 5% 8%
Spain 1 876 135 312 9 973 44 2% 2% 3% 3%
Sweden 1 527 115 318 9 647 43 2% 2% 3% 3%
Slovakia 1 516 105 329 5 923 31 2% 2% 2% 2%
Belgium 1 443 117 244 8 939 47 2% 2% 3% 3%
Luxembourg 1 410 139 213 10 040 54 2% 2% 3% 4%
Denmark 801 80 099 10 613 26 1% 1% 3% 2%
Italy 721 81 424 5 160 28 1% 1% 2% 2%
South Korea 469 141 861 1 875 5 1% 2% 1% 0%
Finland 464 25 165 3 269 15 1% 0% 1% 1%
Norway 185 13 997 1 888 7 0% 0% 1% 0%
Hungary 172 10 107 900 5 0% 0% 0% 0%
Poland 150 4 920 780 12 0% 0% 0% 1%
 
Source: Own computation based on data from Amadeus 
 63 
 
The European Union countries are developed countries with high GDP and have similar 
level of skilled labour endowment as the Czech Republic. These two factors suggest that 
the multinational activities in the Czech Republic will be to some extent driven by                
the horizontal motive. 
Another option to look at patterns of internalization is via the sectoral breakdown. 
As mentioned in previous chapter, Amadeus enables to compile data about affiliate 
and parent’s companies NACE Rev. 2 sector codes at four-digit level. Table 4 presents 
the 2008 affiliate sales detail per sector of activity of parent and affiliate companies. Vertical 
axis denotes sectors in which parent companies operate whilst horizontal axis denotes sector 
in which affiliate companies operate. If the parent and affiliate both operate in the same 
sector, it is plausible that the multinationals are horizontally integrated. If the affiliates’ two-
digit classification differs from those of parent companies, then the companies are likely 
vertically integrated. 
As regards parent sector of activity, manufacturing, financial and insurance activities 
and wholesale and retail trade dominate in the structure of affiliate sales, accounting for more 
than 65% of the total affiliate sales in 2008 (this trend holds much the same also for 
the remaining years 2003 – 2007). As for affiliate sector of activity, manufacturing, wholesale 
and retail trade and transporting and storage sectors dominate, accounting for more than 75% 
of total affiliate sales (the remaining years 2003 – 2007 follow about the same pattern). Refer 
to Appendix 4 for sectoral breakdown of affiliate sales and FDI stocks per parent countries. 
The fraction of affiliate sales operating in the same NACE sector as the parent company 
amounts to EUR million 40 958 in 2008, which represents about 47% of total affiliate sales. 
Thus, this ratio suggests 47% of affiliate sales to be horizontally integrated. Nevertheless, this 
method as well as the geographical breakdown of MNEs’ activities is only a draft 
approximation of internalization pattern and a solid econometric analysis is needed to detect 
the pattern of multinationals activities. 
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Table 4: Affiliate Sales per Sector of Activities of Parent and Affiliate Company, 2008, EUR millions 
 
Source: Own computation based on data from Amadeus 
 
p/a Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 194 168 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
2 1 245 49 167 0 0 0 0 95 0 12 485 0 0 20 60 46 0 310
3 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
4 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0
5 3 375 0 0 0 0 2 681 0 0 0 20 332 38 0 221 30 0 35 19
6 7 129 0 0 0 0 0 2 465 0 0 0 93 0 0 16 389 4 167 0 0
7 16 057 158 330 0 18 71 571 770 16 66 10 762 48 0 214 718 134 67 2 111
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 2 153 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 1 865 101 0 23 76 38 0 0 31
10 31 977 0 218 28 0 0 77 466 0 177 22 132 0 0 189 443 121 11 8 116
11 2 533 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 393 48 0 0 0 0 0 2 092
12 134 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 63
13 8 186 40 145 0 0 623 20 69 17 195 5 135 12 0 658 340 296 238 398
14 201 10 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 106 0 0 0 55 0 0 9
15 2 382 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 465 0 0 0 21 22 750 0 107
16 473 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 11 0 459 0
17 11 632 0 40 0 0 28 0 0 0 74 1 532 0 41 82 269 19 5 9 539
Total 87 715 425 918 28 31 3 425 3 133 1 420 34 3 888 41 142 146 65 1 500 2 389 5 533 815 22 823
Legend: 1) Accomodation and food service activities; 2) Administrative and support service activities; 3) Agriculture, foresty and fishing; 4) Arts, entertainment and recreation; 5) Construction; 6) Electricity, gas, 
steam and air conditioning supply; 7) Financial and insurance activities; 8) Human health and social work activies; 9) Information and communication; 10) Manufacturing; 11) Mining and quarrying; 12) Other 
services activities; 13) Professional, scientific and technical activities; 14) Real estate activities; 15) Transporting and storage; 16) Water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation activities; 17) 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
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5.3 Baseline Model Empirical Results 
 
5.3.1 Country Aggregation Empirical Results 
 
Table 5 presents the estimation results of the knowledge-capital model for data 
aggregated at the country level for both affiliate sales and FDI stock. The table indicates 
similar results and statistical significance for affiliate sales and FDI stock, except for 
intercept.  
The size sum and size difference squared have sign as predicted in the KC model and are 
both statistically significant at 1% level. These provide evidence for horizontal multinationals. 
The effect of skilled labour is less straightforward. The skilled labour difference coefficient is 
negative, suggesting the presence of horizontal FDI, however the statistical significance of    
the effect is weak. The interaction term between the size difference and skill difference is 
negative and statistically significant at 5% level, providing evidence for vertical FDI. 
Parent trade costs are positive and statistically significant at 5% level, indicating that 
higher parent trade costs tend to discourage vertical MNEs whereas enhances horizontal 
MNEs. Host country trade cost coefficient is negative, providing the evidence for vertical 
MNEs, but the effect is not statistically significant. The second interaction variable between 
host country trade costs and skilled difference squared does not have sign as predicted but is 
not statistically significant. 
The value of R-squared is relatively high in both estimations, indicating high goodness of 
fit. 
In summary, the results at the country aggregated level are statistically significant 
for country size variables and the interaction term between the country size and skill 
differences. As these variables provide evidence for both vertical and horizontal components 
of the knowledge-capital model, it is not possible to determine which pattern prevails. 
The estimation results at more disaggregated levels will shed more light in the prevailing 
pattern of internalization of multinationals in the Czech Republic. The following sub-section 
presents the estimation results at sector level aggregated per parent countries. 
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Table 5: Baseline Model Estimation: Country Aggregation, Fixed Effects Model 
 
Affiliate sales FDI
Size sum 8* 2186*
(8.78) (6.04)
Size difference squared -0.42* -92*
(-7.45) (-5.65)
Skilled labour difference -1.01E+07 -1.08E+09
(-0.26) (-0.72)
-22* -1437***
(-3.3) (-1.9)
Trade cost parent 1.19E+06** 3.99E+07**
(2.26) (2.19)
Trade cost host -2.50E+06 -1.48E+08
(-1.42) (-1.51)
1.44E+07 3.12E+09
(0.04) (0.24)
Intercept 2.89E+06 -1.85E+09
(1.2) (-4.98)
R-squared 0.51 0.31
Observation 120 120
No of countries 20 20
Trade cost host x Skill 
difference squared
Size difference x Skill 
difference
t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 1% level,              
** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 10% level
 
5.3.2 Empirical Results per Sectors of Activity at Country Level 
 
The fixed effect regression results of the knowledge-capital model per individual sectors 
aggregated at country level are presented in Table 6 below. These are results for affiliate sales 
and include sectors with more than 10 observations only (85 observations were lost).          
The corresponding results for the FDI stocks are for the majority of cases qualitatively and 
statistically similar to those of affiliate sales and are depicted in Appendix 6. 
As for the secondary sector, the regression results reveal variances across the industries. 
It appears that the horizontal motive prevails in the manufacturing sectors, since all variables 
have signs supporting the horizontal component of the knowledge-capital model. However, 
the coefficients are statistically significant only for size sum and size difference squared 
and hence weaken the explanatory power of the KC model.  
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Table 6: Baseline Model Estimation: Sector Aggregation, Affiliate Sales, Fixed Effects Model 
 
Quaternary 
sector
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Size sum 2.87* 2.72* 12.77* 0.21 0.17 0.35* 0.32 2.45* 4.94 8.53* 0.01 0.57*
(3.26) (1.74) (4.82) (0.9) (1.58) (7.17) (1.36) (7.4) (0.47) (8.33) (0) (2.73)
Size difference squared -0.38 -0.15** -0.50* -0.16 0.00 -0.02* -0.02*** -0.11* 1.63 -0.39* -0.04 -0.02**
(-0.79) (-2) (-3.61) (-1.31) (-0.84) (-6.23) (-1.62) (-7.29) (0.6) (-7.35) (-1.32) (-1.87)
Skilled labour difference 1.26E+06 8.38E+06 -1.08E+07 2.9E+06* -4.43E+05 -4.43E+05* 5.02E+04 -6.88E+05 -4.13E+06-7.96E+06** -6.18E+06* -8.52E+05
(0.74) (1.07) (-1.15) (3.39) (-1.51) (-2.64) (0.07) (-0.67) (-0.4) (-2.2) (-2.38) (-1.18)
-0.15 -2.33 5.76 -2.66* 0.20 -0.21** -0.31 -1.32** 5.23 -4.14** -4.69** 0.07
(-0.04) (-0.66) (1.06) (-2.64) (1.38) (-2.1) (-0.52) (-1.82) (0.24) (-1.97) (-2.3) (0.14)
Trade cost parent 6.80E+04 -7.25E+05 1.25E+054.42E+04** 2.20E+04 6517** -2.31E+035.53E+04** -1.93E+05 1.33E+05* 1.24E+05 1.4E+05*
(0.87) (-1.13) (1.15) (2.32) (1.6) (2.07) (-0.06) (2.23) (-0.49) (3.04) (1.01) (4.34)
Trade cost host 1.18E+05 -7.05E+05 2.54E+04 2.01E+05* 1.32E+04 -7.53E+03 -8.12E+04 -3.38E+05* -4.61E+05 -2.86E+05 -1.83E+05 3.42E+03
(0.75) (-1.26) (0.04) (6.61) (0.47) (-0.6) (-1.32) (-4.05) (-0.5) (-1.09) (-0.93) (0.06)
-1.22E+04 5.04E+07 -8.02E+07 -4.88E+07* 5.87E+05 1.43E+06 1.15E+06*** 1.36E+07** 3.10E+07 3.31E+07 2.92E+06 3.19E+06
(0) (0.72) (-1.15) (-3.16) (0.22) (1.17) (1.76) (1.77) (0.45) (1.23) (0.13) (0.62)
Intercept -1.69E+06 -2.97E+06 -1.23E+07 -1.33E+05 -4.32E+05 -3.73E+05 -1.87E+05 -2.36E+06 -3.15E+07 -7.34E+06 1.84E+06 -8.13E+05
(-3.94) (-0.74) (-4.33) (-1.23) (-2.34) (-5.89) (-0.46) (-5.66) (-1.27) (-6.68) (1.75) (-2.78)
R-squared 0.47 0.24 0.33 0.79 0.65 0.65 0.15 0.61 0.81 0.53 0.30 0.44
Observation 53 28 120 36 33 82 51 79 68 119 75 74
No of  countries 9 5 20 6 6 14 9 15 49 20 14 13
t-robust statistics in parentheses; ***significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, * significant at 1% level
Legend: 1) Construction; 2) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 3) Manufacturing; 4) Water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation activities; 5) 
Accomodation and food service activities; 6) Administrative and support service activities; 7) Financial and insurance activities; 8)Real estate activities; 9) Transporting and storage; 10) 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 11) Information and communication; 12) Professional, scientifc and technical activities
Secondary sector Tertiary sector
Size difference x Skill 
difference
Trade cost host x Skill 
difference squared
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The results for the construction and the electricity, gas and steam sectors provide only 
a partial support for the knowledge-capital model, as the results are statistically significant 
solely for size sum and size difference squared variables for the electricity, gas and steam 
sector and statistically significant for size sum variable for construction sector. The remaining 
variables for these sectors have signs providing the support for both horizontal and vertical 
components of the KC model; nonetheless they have weak statistical significance. On 
the other hand, the water supply, sewerage and waste management sector appears to be driven 
by vertical motive, as the skill related variables are statistically significant and have signs 
supporting the presence of vertical component. The results indicate that the affiliate sales 
of the companies operating in this sector are driven by differences in skilled labour 
abundance. 
Regarding the tertiary sector, the results vary considerably among the sectors. 
The accommodation and food service activities sector have regression results suggesting 
the prevalence of horizontal motive. However, as neither variable is statistically significant, 
this motive cannot be unambiguously affirmed. The same applies to the transporting 
and storage sector. 
The results for administrative and support service activities sector, real estate sector 
and wholesale and retail trade sectors provide a strong support for the knowledge-capital 
model. Indeed, the results reveal the presence of both horizontal and vertical motives. 
Nonetheless, as there are more statistically significant variables providing evidence for 
the horizontal motive than for vertical motive, I conclude on the prevalence of the horizontal 
motive in these sectors. 
The results for the financial and insurance activities sector and the information 
and communication sector support the knowledge-capital only partially. It appears that 
the financial and insurance sector is driven by the horizontal motive only marginally, since 
the only statistically significant variable supporting the horizontal motive is the size 
difference squared. As for the information and communication sector, it appears to be driven 
by the skilled labour abundance, with no clear prevalence of either horizontal or vertical 
motive. 
The results for the professional, scientific and technical activities sector have coefficients 
with both sign and statistically significance supporting the presence of horizontal motive. 
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5.3.3 Empirical Results per Sectors of Activity at Firm Level 
 
The regression results for the knowledge-capital model per sectors of activity at firm 
level for affiliate sales are presented in Table 7. As in previous case, only sectors with more 
than 10 observations were included in the regression. The corresponding results for FDI 
stocks are depicted in Appendix 7. 
The results at firm level include in addition two industries from the primary sector, 
namely agriculture, forestry and fishing and mining and quarrying industries. The R-squared 
for these sectors are very high, indicating a good fit of the model to the data. In addition, 
the variables concerning the economic size and skill difference have signs supporting 
the horizontal component of the KC model. However, the statistical significance 
of the coefficients are rather weak, since the only statistically significant variables are sum 
size and size difference squared for the mining and quarrying industry. 
 As regards secondary sector, the regression results for the manufacturing industry 
confirm the horizontal motive that emerged in the regression results for sector aggregation. 
The results for the construction sector are in line with those from the sector aggregation. 
It appears the horizontal motive prevails in this sector, even though this motive is statistically 
supported only via size variables. The results from the electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply sector are ambiguous, as they indicate the presence of both vertical 
and horizontal components. 
Concerning the tertiary sector, the results once more reveal diversity in pattern 
of internalization among the sectors. The regression results for water supply, sewerage 
and waste management sector indicate the prevalence of the vertical motive (as for sector 
aggregation). Nonetheless, the trade costs variables are all statistically significant and have 
coefficients with sign confirming the presence of horizontal motive. Hence, it appears that this 
sector is driven by both vertical and horizontal motive. 
The accommodation and food service activities industry have results not confirming 
neither a horizontal nor a vertical motive as the magnitude of size difference variable is nil 
and the first interaction term is statistically significant but does not have sign as predicted by 
the KC model. 
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Table 7: Baseline Model Estimation: Firm Level Data, Affiliate Sales, Fixed Effects Model 
 
Quaternary 
sector
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Size sum 1.59 0.37* 1.03* 0.81* 0.43* 0.08 0.11* 0.11* 79.79* 0.50* 0.02 0.14* 1.00* 0.34* 0.06**
(1.12) (4.03) (4.27) (3.38) (8.49) (0.92) (3.3) (5.18) (4.46) (4.79) (0.14) (4.93) (2.86) (9.39) (2.24)
Size difference 
squared
-0.66 -0.12** -0.22*** -0.036* -0.01* -0.06 0.00 0* -3.44* -0.02* 0.00 0.00* -0.05* -0.01* 0.00**
(-1.28) (-2.7) (-1.72) (-3.47) (-5.86) (-1.22) (-1.31) (-4.25) (-4.7) (-4.42) (-0.19) (-3.43) (-3.83) (-7.39) (-2.02)
Skilled labour 
difference
-1.61E+06 -2.59E+05 9.93E+04 2.86E+06** -4.65E+05** 7.99E+05* -7.22E+04 -5.35E+04 4.06E+07 -5.39E+05 2.47E+04 1.71E+05** -2.33E+05 -2.66E+05** 4.81E+04
(-0.74) (-0.92) (0.2) (2.11) (-2.1) (2.35) (-0.87) (-0.69) (0.74) (-1.39) (0.02) (2) (-0.23) (-1.86) (0.5)
-0.22 0.64 -0.21 -0.29 0.51* -0.80** 0.18* -0.01 -12.26 0.17 -0.04 0.15 -0.90 0.09 -0.03
(-0.1) (1) (-0.2) (-0.37) (4.1) (-2.01) (2.76) (-0.2) (-0.22) (0.74) (-0.13) (1.53) (-0.75) (1.08) (-0.39)
Trade cost parent 1.37E+03 6.63E+02 8.90E+03 -7.08E+04 -1.99E+05* 1.42E+04*** 4.15E+03 2.07E+03 -3.76E+06 3.36E+03 -2.84E+03 -4.04E+03 -6.55E+04 9.97E+03* 4.25E+03
(0.07) (0.1) (0.36) (-0.66) (-3.98) (1.81) (0.82) (1.19) (-0.94) (0.21) (-0.08) (-1.2) (-1.35) (2.99) (1.09)
Trade cost host 2.50E+05 -1.25E+04 -1.98E+04 -9.57E+03 -4.78E+03 3.38E+04* 5.61E+03 7.11E+03 -1.21E+07* -1.23E+04 3.30E+04 5.96E+03 -1.84E+05** 1.28E+04 -7.05E+03
(1.93) (-0.74) (-0.55) (-0.09) (-0.31) (3.29) (0.61) (1.18) (-2.33) (-0.38) (0.43) (0.71) (-1.85) (1.18) (-0.89)
-2.41E+07 3.97E+06 4.01E+06 4.12E+05 -4678452* -1.21E+07** 5.38E+05 -5.08E+04 4.61E+08 9.24E+05 2.14E+06 -1.68E+06** 1.04E+07 1.76E+06 1.05E+06
(-1.79) (1.17) (0.98) (0.03) (-2.57) (-2.15) (0.51) (-0.08) (0.83) (0.22) (0.21) (-1.97) (0.97) (1.32) (1.13)
Intercept -6.85E+05 -1.56E+05 -6.50E+05 -1.30E+06 -6.27E+05 -1.80E+04 -1.76E+05 -1.68E+05 -8.28E+07 -9.06E+05 -3.59E+04 -1.51E+05 -6.06E+05 -5.08E+05 -7.86E+04
(-0.98) (-2.79) (-4.82) (-2.67) (-7.07) (-0.39) (-4.91) (-4.54) (-2.9) (-3.44) (-0.11) (-4.35) (-1.52) (-8.05) (-1.59)
R-squared 0.81 0.86 0.25 0.26 0.09 0.42 0.60 0.31 0.28 0.22 0.29 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.04
Observation 14 19 167.00 100.00 3089 96 76 210 132.00 246 17 500 242 1989 426
No of companies 3 5 30 20 574 17 18 41 25 48 4 146 47 388 93
Legend: 1) Agriculture, forestry and fishing; 2) Mining and quarrying; 3) Construction; 4) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 5) Manufacturing; 6) Water supply; sewerage; waste management and 
remediation activities; 7) Accomodation and food service activities; 8) Administrative and support service activities; 9) Financial and insurance activities; 10) Information and communication; 11) Other services activities; 
12) Real estate activities; 13) Transporting and storage; 14) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 15) Professional, scientific and technical activities
Tertiary sectorSecondary sectorPrimary sector
Size difference x 
Skill difference
Trade cost host x 
Skill difference 
squared
t-robust statistics in parentheses; ***significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, * significant at 1% level
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The results for administrative and support service activities are statistically significant for 
size sum and size difference squared variables. However, the magnitude of size difference 
squared variable is nil. The signs of other variables confirm the horizontal motive but their 
statistical significance is weak and thus the support for the horizontal motive in this sector is 
not strong. 
The financial and insurance activities sector has results that are sensitive to size sum 
and size difference in a way providing the evidence for horizontal motive. Nevertheless, 
the prevalence of the horizontal motive is weak in this sector, as other variables do not always 
have signs as predicted for horizontal motive, albeit their statistical insignificance. 
Regression results for information and communication, transporting and storage 
and wholesale and retail trade sectors indicate a good support for the horizontal motive, 
especially in case of wholesale and retail trade sector. 
The pattern of internalization in the other services sector does not seem to be driven by 
either horizontal or vertical motives. The same applies for the professional, scientific 
and technical activities. 
Results for real estate sector are ambiguous, providing support for both horizontal 
and vertical motives. 
In overall, the results follow largely the predictions of the knowledge-capital model, even 
though the statistical significances of the coefficients are not strong in all cases. An interesting 
finding worth mentioning is the results for the host country trade costs, which contradicts 
the predictions of the knowledge-capital model for about half of sectors. In these cases, 
the results indicate that falling host country trade costs encourage the horizontal foreign 
investment. Indeed, such a result confirms the global empirical experience of the last two 
decades, since it has been observed that lower trade costs lead to higher horizontal FDI.  
The explanation of the contradiction between theory and empirical evidence in the effect 
of host country trade costs can be found e.g. in Neary (2007), who comes up with two 
explanations. The first explanation concerns FDI in trading blocks, which is enhanced by 
falling trade cost. This horizontal FDI represents a form of export-platform FDI, where 
a foreign firm invests in one country in order to serve the entire block. The second 
explanation rests in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. This type of FDI has become 
quantitatively more important than greenfield FDI and is encouraged by lower trade costs, 
rather than higher trade costs. Thus, negative coefficients of host country trade costs in fact 
 72 
 
may indicate the presence of other forms of internalization than just pure horizontal and pure 
vertical ones. 
5.4 Spatial lag Model Empirical Results 
 
Table 8 presents the estimation results for Model 2 per sectors of activity, aggregated at 
country level. As in Model 1, only sectors with more than 10 observations were tested. These 
are estimation results for affiliate sales, the results for FDI stocks are reported in Appendix 8.  
Each sector exhibits two estimations – the first column displays the estimation results 
of the restricted model, excluding the third country effects whilst the second column displays 
the estimation results of the full model, including the third country effects variables. 
The rationale behind running two regressions is the assessment of the sensitivity of gravity 
variables to the inclusion of third country effects.  
Looking at the restricted results, it appears that investment flows from large and wealthy 
countries (significant negative impact of population indicates wealthy countries, holding GDP 
equal) for construction, manufacturing, accommodation and food service activities, financial 
and insurance activities and information and communication activities. Further, 
accommodation and food service activities, administrative and support service activities, 
transporting and storage, wholesale and retail trade and professional, scientific and technical 
activities reported a positive correlation between affiliate sales and skilled labour of parent 
countries. Construction is the only sector with statistically significant negative influence of 
parent’s skilled labour on affiliate sales. Affiliate sales in electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply and wholesale and retail trade sector are also positively correlated with 
the parent’s country size, whilst the opposite holds for administrative and support service 
activities. Distance exerts statistically significant negative impact on all sectors but water 
supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities. 
The inclusion of third country effects in the restricted model yields various results across 
the sectors. The OLS results remained robust to the inclusion of third country effects for 
following sectors: electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, administrative 
and support service activities, real estate activities and transporting and storage sector. 
For the remaining sectors, the inclusion of third country effects either alters the statistical 
significance of gravity variables, or changes the sign of coefficients. 
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Table 8: Spatial lag Model Estimation: Full Sample, Affiliate Sales, OLS and Maximum Likelihood Estimations 
 
 
OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6
Parent population -2.17* -0.36 -0.45 -2.63* -0.85* -0.61* -11.65 -0.34 -7.65* -3.12 1.44* 1.25*
(-4.57) (-0.43) (-0.62) (-2.89) (-3.7) (-1.43) (-6.89) (-0.43) (-4.23) (2.62) (7.3) (4.61)
Parent GDP 2.77* 0.00 0.81** 3.11* 1.43* -0.34* 12.36 -0.65 12.5* -11.45** -0.83* -3.41*
(6.06) (1) (0) (0) (0) 0.00 (0) (0) (5.25) (0.06) (0) (0)
Parent skilled labour 
endowment
-16.21* -9* -2.19 -6.75* 1.22 0.66* -13.52 -0.10 24.38* 2.69 7.16* 5.63*
(-7.97)] (-2.58) (-0.91) (-2.88) (1.45) (0.53) (-6.74) (-0.09) (4) (6.21) (6.48) (5.54)
Parent trade costs 0.07 0.29 0.45*** 0.38** 0.30 -0.14 -0.89 0.17 -0.13 -0.30 0.12 0.1***
(0.1) (0.59) (1.82) (2.06) (1.49) (-1.03) (-1.66) (1.37) (-0.17) (0.49) (0.86) (1.83)
Distance -1.38* -1.42 -1.64* -1.94* -0.87* 0.14 1.51* 0.41* -9.26* 8.47* -0.57* 0.60
(-4) (-1.55) (-20.96) (-7.15) (-5.65) (0.17) (5.66) (2.56) (-4.5) (3.36) (-4.85) (1.54)
Trend 0.9*** -0.26 0.13 -0.39 0.46 0.15 0.17 1.74* -1.51** 2.14 0.4*** 0.86*
(1.67) (-0.28) (0.92) (1.31) (1.63) (0.41) (0.45) (8.48) (-2.15) (1.65) (1.75) (4.02)
Trend
2 -0.11 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.05*** -0.06 -0.03 -0.08* 0.17*** -0.09 -0.03 -0.08*
(-1.39) (-1.5) (0.08) (-0.88) (-1.23) (-1.83) (-0.61) (-7.38) (1.85) (0.1) (-1.06) (-5.57)
Parent market proximity -- 0.39 -- -0.91 -- 1.56 -- 0.79* -- 14.61* -- 2.88*
(0.24) (-1.6) (1.12) (4.41) (3.52) (4.45)
Host market proximity -- 24.16*** -- -2.95 -- 7.10 -- -15.43* -- -11.44 -- 0.65
(1.77) (-0.73) (1) (-5.49) (16.39) (0.27)
Spatial lag -- -2.29* -- -0.18 -- -0.41 -- -2.37* -- -4.68* -- -1.14*
(-2.63) (-0.86) (-0.63) (-14.4) (1.6) (-4.78)
Intercept -11.05 -260.81 14.66 56.54 9.66 -80.48 -59.29 223.92 4.20 114.34 16.30 5.78
(-3.54) (-1.61) (2.87) (1.12) (6.57) (-0.98) (-5.93) (6.4) (0.45) (202.32) (9.7) (0.19)
R-squared 0.69 -- 0.98 -- 0.56 -- 0.69 -- 0.66 -- 0.72 --
Observation 53 53 28 28 117 117 36 36 36 36 78 78
No of countries 9 9 5 5 20 20 6 6 6 6 14 14
t and z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 10 % level
Tertiary sectorSecondary sector 
Legend: 1) Construction; 2) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 3) Manufacturing; 4) Water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation activities; 5) 
Accomodation and food service activities; 6) Administrative and support service activities; 
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Table 8: Spatial lag Model Estimation: Full Sample, Affiliate Sales, OLS and Maximum Likelihood Estimations cont’d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML
7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12
Parent population -3.61* -1.93 0.14 0.03 0.49** 0.39** 0.08 0.47 -1.2* -2* 1.33 0.69
(-3.79) (-1.19) (0.42) (0.06) (2.1) (2.24) (0.35) (1.12) (-2.73) (-2.98) (1.31) (0.66)
Parent GDP 4.42* 0.77 0.06 1.70 0.38 2.63* 0.76* -3.37** 1.59* -0.77 -0.36 -4.47*
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
-1.56 -1.23 0.59 0.60 7.09* 7.07* 1.99** 0.52 2.27 -1.57 5.21** 3.95***
(-0.75) (-0.81) (0.5) (0.37) (5.53) (7.67) (2.01) (0.56) (1.12) (-0.56) (2.29) (1.72)
Parent trade costs -0.06 0.25 0.98* 0.42** 1.03* 0.75* 0.14 -0.14 0.32 0.55 -0.84 -0.33
(-0.14) (1.13) (4.12) (2.2) (3.64) (3.69) (0.69) (-1.2) (0.53) (1.44) (-1.41) (-0.68)
Distance -2.01* -1.56*** -0.91* -1.98* -2.3* -3.59* -1.28* 0.43 -0.55** 0.23 -1.03* 1.05
(-7.43) (-2.01) (-4.93) (-3.1) (-14.89) (-15.18) (-7.83) (0.53) (-2.09) (0.24) (-3.94) (1.63)
Trend 0.01 0.62 0.82** -1.11 0.07 -0.51 0.53*** 0.68** 0.09 0.04 0.06 -2.76*
(0.03) (1.37) (2.12) (-1.46) (0.28) (-1.13) (1.76) (1.94) (0.17) (0.06) (0.12) (-2.61)
Trend
2 -0.01 -0.08** -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.11* -0.02 -0.12** 0.02 -0.01
(-0.12) (-2.44) (-0.67) (0.87) (0.44) (1.19) (-1.44) (-4.44) (-0.29) (-2.35) (0.26) (-0.13)
Parent market proximity -- 1.68 -- -1.77*** -- -2.24* -- 3.73* -- 3.09** -- 5.04
(1.26) (-1.89) (-6.21) (2.9) (1.92) (3.84)
Host market proximity -- 2.50 -- 27.32** -- 6.98 -- 8.98** -- 17.62 -- 61.7*
(0.35) (2.27) (1.12) (1.92) (1.56) (3.65)
Spatial lag -- -2.26** -- -0.18 -- 0.45** -- -1.95* -- -2.59* -- -2.3*
(-2.26) (-0.55) (2.06) (-3.49) (-3.36) (-3.32)
Intercept -0.12 0.30 12.59 -310.43 22.17 -57.58 11.76 -86.81 8.39 -189.98 12.90 -749.61*
(-0.02) (0) (5.89) (-2.13) (10.29) (-0.75) (7.3) (-1.54) (2.4) (-1.4) (2.1) (-3.64)
R-squared 0.92 0.52 0.82 0.54 0.42 0.54
Observation 49 49 80 80 67 67 117 117 80 80 74 74
No of countries 9 9 15 15 12 12 20 20 14 14 13 13
t and z statistics in parentheses; ***significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, * significant at 1% level
Tertiary sector Quaternary sector
Legend: 7) Financial and insurance activities; 8)Real estate activities; 9) Transporting and storage; 10) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 11) 
Information and communication; 12) Professional, scientifc and technical activities
Parent skilled labour 
endowment
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Regarding the effect of third country effects per se, the results are highly ambiguous. 
Contradictory to the theory, the effect of host and parent market potentials were found to be 
negative for a number of sectors. 
A possible explanation for negative correlation between parent market proximity 
and affiliate sales may be the fact that parent market proximity also captures the effect 
of concurrent FDI from other parent countries (in this case the crowding out effect) since 
the bigger the size of other parent’s market, the higher the potential investment to the host 
country. Regarding the negative effect of host country market potential on affiliate sales, it 
can proxy a competitive pressure of other host countries with similar characteristics that may 
lure the potential investments from parent countries away from the host country in question. 
Coming back to the estimation results, the parent market proximity exerts statistically 
significant positive effects on water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities, accommodation and food service activities, administrative and support service 
activities, wholesale and retail trade and information and communication sector. The positive 
effect of parent market proximity on affiliate sales provides empirical evidence for vertical 
pattern of internalization. This variable exerts a negative effect on real estate activities and 
transporting and storage sectors. 
The host market potential has a positive statistically significant effect on affiliate sales 
for construction, real estate, wholesale and retail trade and professional, scientific 
and technical activities sector, indicating the presence of export platform FDI and complex 
vertical FDI. On the other hand, this variable statistically significantly impacts on water 
supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities. 
The results for spatial lag indicate a crowding out effect for the majority of sectors, 
namely for construction, water supplies, sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities, accommodation and food service activities, administrative and support service 
activities, financial and insurance activities, wholesale and retail trade, information 
and communication and professional, scientific and technical activities. The results reveal 
a positive spill-over effect only for transporting and storage sector. 
It can be seen that the effects of the third country variable vary across the sectors and no 
clear conclusion can be drawn in general. In order to refine the results, I additionally run 
the regression for the European sub-sample, excluding the data from the U.S.A., Japan and 
Korea, as Blonigen et al. (2005, 2007) and Garretsen et Peeters (2008) reported sensitivity of 
third county effects on the geographical composition of the data. This holds true here as well, 
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nevertheless the results got worse as the effects of third country variable turned statistically 
insignificant for the majority of sectors. For the results for the European sub-sample refer to 
Appendix 9. Thus, it appears that the third country affect to some extent on the multinationals 
activities in the host country. Nonetheless, the significance of influence is sensitive to 
the geographical composition of the data and so does the omitted variable bias in case of their 
exclusion from the model.  
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5.5 Hypotheses Reconciliation 
 
Table 9: Reconciliation of Hypotheses with Estimation Results 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
n.a. n.a. yes yes yes no no yes no no n.a. yes no yes yes
no yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes
n.a. n.a. no yes yes no no yes yes no n.a. yes no yes yes
no yes yes yes yes no no no yes yes no no yes yes no
n.a. n.a. no no no yes no yes no yes n.a. no no yes no
no no no yes yes yes no no no no no yes no yes no
n.a. n.a. no no no yes no yes no yes n.a. yes no yes no
no no no no no yes no no no no no no no no no
n.a. n.a. no no no yes no yes no no n.a. yes no yes no
no no no no no yes no no no no no no no yes no
n.a. n.a. no no no yes no no no no n.a. no no no yes
no no no no no yes no no no no no no no no no
Results provide evidence that Ha is true (zero hypothesis is rejected)
Sector aggregation at country level
Sector aggregation at firm level
Size sum Yes
Size difference 
squared
Yes
Hypothesis 1: A bilateral increase in parent and 
host country incomes (GDPs) increases sales of 
affiliates of parent country horizontal firms.
Hypothesis 2: A convergence in income (GDP) 
between host and parent country increases sales of 
affiliates of parent country horizontal firms.
Country 
aggregation
Hypothesis 6: An increase in host country trade 
costs increases sales of affiliates of parent country 
horizontal firms.
Size difference x 
Skill difference
Yes
Parent trade 
costs
Yes
Alternative Hypothesis Variable
Host country 
trade costs
No
Hypothesis 3: A convergence in skilled labour 
endowment between host and parent country 
increases sales of affiliates of parent country 
horizontal firms whereas a divergence in skilled 
labour endowment between host and parent 
country increases sales of affiliates of parent country 
vertical firms.
Hypothesis 4: Parent country vertical affiliate sales 
are highest when parent country is both moderately 
small and skilled labour abundant.
Hypothesis 5: An increase in parent country trade 
costs decreases sales of affiliates of parent country 
vertical firms in favour of parent country horizontal 
firms.
Skill difference No
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Table 9: Reconciliation of Hypotheses with Estimation Results cont’d 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
n.a. n.a. no no no yes no no no no n.a. no no no no
no no no no yes yes no no no no no yes no no no
n.a. n.a. yes no no yes yes no yes yes n.a. no no yes yes
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. no no no yes yes yes no yes n.a. no no yes no
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. yes no no no no no no no n.a. yes no yes yes
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. yes no no yes yes yes yes yes n.a. no yes yes yes
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Host country 
trade costs x Skill 
difference
No
Alternative Hypothesis
Hypothesis 7: Bilateral increase in host country 
trade costs and skilled labour difference between 
host and parent countries reduces sales of affiliates 
of parent country horizontal firms.
Hypothesis 8: Exclusion of variables capturing 
third country effects lead to omitted variable bias of 
the results (results for full sample).
Legend: 1) Agriculture, forestry and fishing; 2) Mining and quarrying; 3) Construction; 4) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 5) Manufacturing;      
6) Water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation activities; 7) Accomodation and food service activities; 8) Administrative and support service 
activities; 9) Financial and insurance activities; 10) Information and communication; 11) Other services activities; 12) Real estate activities; 13) Transporting and 
storage; 14) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 15) Professional, scientific and technical activities
Host market 
proximity
n.a.
Spatial lag
Hypothesis 10: Host proximity to third-country 
markets increases sales of affiliates of parent 
country export platform firms (results for full 
sample).
Hypothesis 11: Presence of other FDI in host 
country may crowd out further FDI or induce 
positive externalities in host country (results for full 
sample).
Hypothesis 9: Parent proximity to third-country 
markets increases sales of affiliates of parent 
country vertical firms.
n.a.
Variable
Results provide evidence that Ha is true (zero hypothesis is rejected)
Country 
aggregation
Sector aggregation at country level
Sector aggregation at firm level
Parent market 
proximity
n.a.
n.a.--
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I presented the estimation results of two classes of empirical models. 
Firstly, I carried out the estimation of the knowledge-capital model for three levels 
of aggregation: country aggregation, sector aggregation at country level and sector 
aggregation at firm level to disentangle the possible patterns of internalization of MNEs in the 
Czech Republic. 
The results confirmed the presence of both horizontal and vertical patterns, however 
the prevalence of these pattern differ across the levels of aggregation. The regression results 
for data aggregated at country level indicated both horizontal and vertical motives, with no 
clear prevalence of either type. By reconciling the results for aggregated data per sector of 
activity at both country and firm level, it appeared that horizontal motive tend to dominate in 
mining and quarrying sector, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, 
manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade sectors. The presence of both vertical and 
horizontal motive was found in water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities and real estate activities sectors. For the remaining sectors, the results of the 
aggregated data differ at country and firm level, suggesting that either the knowledge-capital 
model is not an appropriate model for disentangling the pattern of internalization, or these 
sectors are driven by more complex types of internalization, such as export platform FDI or 
complex vertical FDI.  
 
Following, I ran the regression of the spatial lag model to determine the effect of third 
country variables. The results indicated that the third country effects were highly sensitive to 
the geographical composition of the data. When testing the full sample, the third country 
effects revealed crowding out effect for all sectors but electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply, manufacturing and transporting and storage sectors. For the last 
mentioned sector, the results indicated a positive spill-over effect. The parent market 
proximity turned out to be statistically positively significant for water supply, sewerage, waste 
management and remediation activities, accommodation and food service activities, 
administrative and support service activities, wholesale and retail trade and information 
and communication sector, indicating a present of vertical motive of internalization. The host 
market potential has a positive statistically significant effect on affiliate sales for construction, 
real estate, wholesale and retail trade and professional, scientific and technical activities 
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sector, indicating the presence of export platform FDI and complex vertical FDI. This 
suggests that the multinational activities in the Czech Republic go beyond the simple pure 
horizontal versus vertical range and partly explains the poor fit of the knowledge-capital for 
the certain sectors of activity. 
Contradictory to the theory, the results on parent and host market proximity revealed also 
a negative influence on a number of sectors. Specifically, the parent market proximity was 
statically significant and negative for real estate activities and transporting and storage 
sectors, whilst host country market proximity was statistically significant and negative for 
water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities. The negative effect of 
parent market proximity may indicate a potential crowding out effect, whilst the negative host 
country market proximity effect may point out the competitive pressure from other host 
countries for potential inward foreign investments. 
When the regression of the spatial lag model was run on a European sub-sample, 
the results turned out to be statistically insignificant for most of sectors. This suggests 
the variable bias resulting from third country effects omission depends on the geographical 
composition of the data.     
 
Regarding the hypotheses confirmation, the results in overall provide the strongest 
support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, stating the relationship between the market size and affiliate 
sales of horizontally integrated multinationals. These hypotheses postulate that a bilateral 
increase in host and parent countries’ GDP and/or a convergence in GDP between parent 
and host countries increases affiliate sales of horizontal multinationals.  
Hypotheses stating the impact of skilled labour were confirmed only partially, implying 
that the skilled labour endowment/difference played in many sectors solely a minor role 
in multinationals decisions to invest in the Czech Republic. The rationale behind this rather 
surprising result may dwell in the inappropriate proxy for skilled labour, and other proxies 
such as direct labour costs or cost of employees may bring more distinct results. However, 
I decided to employ this proxy for skilled labour as in Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen 
and Maskus (2002a) for consistency reasons. Although a weak support of Hypothesis 4 may 
simply rest in the lack of vertical component in the tested data at disaggregated level. 
Hypotheses about the trade cost of parent and host countries were confirmed solely in 
few sectors. A possible explanation of the contradicting results with the theoretical predictions 
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may be the presence of other type of internalization, such as export platform FDI or merger 
and acquisitions, which are driven by low trade costs. 
Lastly, hypotheses concerning third country effects had only a limited validity, as they 
were relatively well supported for the full sample, especially the spatial lag variable; however 
the results on a European sub-sample rejected the hypothesis in favor of zero hypotheses 
stating no effect of third country effects on affiliate sales for the majority of sectors. 
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6 
Conclusion 
 
This master thesis utilizes the firm-level data for the period 2003-2008 provided by 
Amadeus database to investigate the pattern of internalization of multinationals in the Czech 
Republic and to evaluate the potential effects of third countries on inward FDI to the Czech 
Republic. 
In order to disentangle the pattern of internalization, I applied the knowledge-capital 
model developed by Markusen et al. (1996). The model was tested on data aggregated at 
different levels of aggregation. In overall, the results provided an empirical evidence for both 
horizontal and vertical motives of internalization, with the prevalence of either motive varying 
across the sectors and the levels of aggregation. The variances in the results indicate the 
importance of the sector and firm-level heterogeneity and the level of data aggregation on 
determining the patterns of internalization. It appears that data at more disaggregated level 
enable to identify patterns that have been missed at aggregated level, as they were not 
observable at higher level of aggregation.  
The empirical estimations provided a support for the knowledge-capital model only 
partially, as the results for the data at disaggregated level were statistically insignificant or 
yielded opposite signs than predicted by the model for some variables in a number of sectors, 
namely the interaction terms capturing the non-linearity of the model and the host and parent 
trade costs variables. This may indicate that the horizontal and vertical motives are not driven 
primarily by the comparative advantage or the market seeking motives as the knowledge-
capital postulates, but the decision making process of multinationals takes into consideration 
more complex factors7. Further, the partial support of the knowledge-capital model may imply 
that there are different patterns of internalization, other than pure vertical and pure horizontal, 
that characterize multinationals activities in various sectors of activity. 
                                                 
7
 E.g. Alfaro and Charlton (2009) identified a high proportion of north-north vertical FDI with small skill 
differences between parent and host, where a subsidiary sources the inputs to its parent internally. This type of 
vertical FDI was found in high-skill sectors with stages of production close to parents’ final stage of production. 
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To evaluate the third country effects, I employed a spatial lag model that incorporated 
spatial lag and host and parent market potentials variables. Apart from capturing third country 
effects, the parent and host market proximity also gauge more complex patterns of 
internalization, such as export-platform FDI and complex vertical FDI.  
As for the knowledge-capital model, the results of the spatial lag model varied across    
the sectors. The results provided evidence for the existence of export platform and complex 
vertical FDI for a number of sectors and thus confirm the assumption that multinationals 
activities go beyond the simple horizontal and vertical range. The estimation results for spatial 
lag variable indicated a crowding out effect for the majority of sectors. Nevertheless, this is a 
net effect and as such, it features the dominant force and does not imply that no spillover 
effects exist. Parent and host market proximities where found to enhance inward FDI in some 
sectors and at the same time to discourage inward FDI in other sectors. 
In order to refine the results, I carried out the regression of the spatial lag model for 
a European sub-sample and found out that effects of third country variables turned statistically 
insignificant for most sectors. This implies that the third country effects are highly sensitive to 
the geographical composition of the data, which is a constraint that weakens the general 
validity of the results. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List of Parent (Home) Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: List of Potential Host Countries 
 
 
 
 
Austria Italy
Belgium Japan
Germany Luxembourg
Denmark Netherland
Spain Norway
Finland Poland
France Sweden
Great Britain Slovakia
Switzerland U.S.A.
Bulgaria Poland
Estonia Romania
Hungary Slovakia
Lativa Slovenia
Lithuania
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Appendix 3: Variables Definition and Units of Measurement 
Variable Definition Unit of 
Measurement 
ijtSales  Affiliate sales in host country i of parent 
country j in time t 
EUR thousands 
ijtFDIstock  pofOwnershixTotalAsset ijt %  EUR thousands 
ijtSizeSum  jtit SizeSize +  EUR millions 
2
ijtSizeDiff  ( )2jtit SizeSize −  EUR millions 
ijtSkillDiff  jtit SkillSkill −  Index [0;1] 
ijtijt SizeDiffSkillDiff  )()( jtitjtit SizeSizexSkillSkill −−  EUR thousands 
itTradeCost  
FOB
jit
CIF
ijt
ort
import
exp  
Index [0;∞] 
jtTradeCost  
FOB
ijt
CIF
jit
ort
import
exp  
Index [0;∞] 
2
ijtjt SkillDiffTradeCost  2)( jtitjt SkillSkillTradeCost −  Index [0;∞] 
itPopulation  Total population of parent country Thousands 
ijDist  Geographical distance between 2 countries 
capital cities 
Kilometres 
itoximityetParentMark Pr  
 
174
ktki ik
GDPd∑ ≠  
EUR millions 
jtoximityHostMarket Pr  ltlj jl
GDPd∑ ≠
252
 
EUR millions 
Spatial Lag 
ijtSales..Wρ  EUR thousands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 92 
 
Appendix 4: Affiliate Sales per Sector of Activity and Parent Country, 2008, EUR millions 
Source: Own computation based on data from Amadeus 
 
Parent Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
AT 6 770 42 42 0 0 898 0 506 34 90 1623 38 0 176 136 265 92 2827
BE 1 443 0 92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1094 0 0 25 13 0 0 219
DE 23 789 0 80 0 0 595 2267 622 0 1819 8974 12 65 212 736 4369 11 4027
DK 801 0 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 236 0 0 0 140 70 73 256
ES 1 876 0 0 0 0 658 0 0 0 0 977 0 0 34 10 0 35 161
FI 464 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 66 337 0 0 0 0 0 0 49
FR 9 783 85 33 0 0 1190 0 79 0 19 6439 0 0 134 89 81 442 1190
GB 6 624 147 132 0 0 0 221 21 0 36 1074 48 0 213 17 47 0 4668
HU 172 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 161 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
CH 3 913 0 26 0 0 12 0 0 0 105 2430 0 0 0 67 116 0 1156
IT 721 5 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 478 0 0 7 0 0 0 222
JP 4 844 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4247 0 0 0 98 0 0 480
KR 469 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 318 0 0 0 152 0 0 0
LU 1 410 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1058 0 0 0 155 0 0 194
NL 17 525 97 331 0 0 0 0 47 0 1389 8359 48 0 308 494 295 11 6146
NO 185 0 14 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 88 0 0 0 18 0 0 37
PL 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 127
SE 1 527 0 41 0 0 0 0 135 0 99 602 0 0 22 0 0 0 629
SK 1 516 0 16 0 18 45 625 0 0 32 323 0 0 0 200 34 0 224
US 3 731 49 75 0 13 0 19 0 0 229 1828 0 0 137 64 38 0 1279
Total 87 715 425 918 28 31 3 425 3 133 1 419 34 3 888 40 664 146 65 1 268 2 389 5 315 665 23 902
Legend: 1) Accomodation and food service activities; 2) Administrative and support service activities; 3) Agriculture, foresty and fishing; 4) Arts, entertainment and recreation; 5) 
Construction; 6) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 7) Financial and insurance activities; 8) Human health and social work activies; 9) Information and communication; 
10) Manufacturing; 11) Mining and quarrying; 12) Other services activities; 13) Professional, scientific and technical activities; 14) Real estate activities; 15) Transporting and storage; 
16) Water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation activities; 17) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
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Appendix 5: FDI Stock per Sector of Activity and Parent Country, 2008, EUR millions 
Source: Own computation based on data from Amadeus 
 
Parent Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
AT 596 417 7 063 6 601 0 0 69 141 0 131 054 2 899 6 224 126 723 4 280 0 21 219 99 018 8 333 5 515 108 348
BE 117 244 0 3 115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 101 027 0 0 1 262 3 379 0 0 8 461
DE 1 812 104 0 8 554 0 0 33 672 154 399 147 609 0 70 304 445 843 618 3 528 19 419 278 626 505 637 1 730 142 164
DK 80 099 0 0 0 0 1 176 0 0 0 0 20 109 0 0 0 25 041 6 397 10 443 16 932
ES 135 312 0 0 0 0 20 784 0 0 0 0 70 238 0 0 1 639 7 963 0 26 742 7 946
FI 25 165 0 531 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 065 17 012 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 557
FR 503 963 3 279 3 248 0 0 57 313 0 8 235 0 314 267 934 0 0 15 789 43 183 4 226 32 821 67 621
GB 357 251 5 383 2 600 0 0 0 8 351 8 502 0 1 976 80 240 7 906 0 15 531 19 006 6 221 0 201 534
HU 10 107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 107
CH 280 326 0 17 803 0 0 3 386 0 0 0 11 378 179 698 0 0 0 18 725 3 243 0 46 094
IT 81 424 2 043 0 0 0 0 0 10 167 0 10 160 42 458 0 0 1 595 0 0 0 15 000
JP 123 771 0 1 237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 541 0 0 0 7 656 0 0 38 338
KR 141 861 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 126 306 0 0 0 6 801 0 0 8 755
LU 139 213 0 1 468 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 065 0 0 1 853 26 163 0 0 13 665
NL 1 107 958 9 068 93 144 0 0 5 951 0 275 0 13 555 471 894 8 037 0 106 692 140 571 21 832 433 236 504
NO 13 997 0 682 7 665 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 299 0 0 5 351
PL 4 920 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 901 128 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 891
SE 115 318 0 1 382 0 0 0 0 2 246 0 12 814 48 241 0 0 1 615 0 0 0 49 019
SK 106 762 0 1 620 0 2 509 4 115 20 651 0 0 2 392 57 291 0 0 533 4 011 4 355 0 9 286
US 166 073 339 4 922 0 609 0 1 426 0 0 6 818 101 343 0 0 5 196 6 346 798 0 38 274
Total 5 919 284 27 176 146 906 7 665 3 117 195 538 184 828 308 089 2 899 140 901 2 329 092 20 841 3 528 192 344 686 787 561 042 77 684 1 030 845
Legend: 1) Accomodation and food service activities; 2) Administrative and support service activities; 3) Agriculture, foresty and fishing; 4) Arts, entertainment and recreation; 5) 
Construction; 6) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 7) Financial and insurance activities; 8) Human health and social work activies; 9) Information and 
communication; 10) Manufacturing; 11) Mining and quarrying; 12) Other services activities; 13) Professional, scientific and technical activities; 14) Real estate activities; 15) 
Transporting and storage; 16) Water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation activities; 17) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
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Appendix 6: Baseline Model Estimation: Sector Aggregation, FDI Stock, Fixed Effect Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Size sum 221.25* 2.72*** 516.81* 37.65 41.74** 48.84* 255.64* 967.95* 1011.13* 478.29* -269.70**
(3.95) (1.74) (3.69) (1.24) (2.03) (2.93) (4.22) (5.42) (5.86) (5.85) (-2.22)
Size difference squared -44.50 -0.15** -25.44* -12.28 -1.95** -2.17* -12.69* -46.19* -49.58* -19.49* 7.88
(-1.45) (-2) (-3.51) (-0.78) (-2.01) (-2.87) (-4.89) (-5.84) (-6.45) (-4.56) (1.39)
Skilled labour difference 2.09E0+08** 8.38E+06 -4.16E+08 2.14E+08 -6.89E+06 -1.61E+08* 2.68E+08 -3.09E+08 -1.02E+08 -8.38E+08* -3.83E+08
(1.92) (1.07) (-0.83 (1.87) (-0.18) (-3.24) (1.5) (-0.6) (-0.21) (-2.85) (-0.88)
-227.24 -2.33 -357.87 -134.72** -17.07 -19.88 -186.98 -576.55 -582.82*** 90.56 -431.40
(-0.87) (-0.66) (-1.25) (-1) (-0.63) (-0.56) (-1.21) (-1.4) (-1.6) (0.49) (-1.27)
Trade cost parent 5.71E+06 -7.25E+05 -2.68E+05 2.81E+06 -2.52E+05 4.18E+06* -8.60E+062.66E+07** -2.89E+07 2.07E+07* 7.07E+06
(1.15) (-1.13) (-0.05) (1.11) (-0.1) (3.24) (-0.89) (2.02) (-1.2) (3.39) (0.34)
Trade cost host 1.32E+06 -7.05E+05 -1.48E+07 1.66E+07*-8626239*** -9.76E+06* -4.94E+07* -1.47E+08* -1.93E+08* -4.11E+07** 1.16E+07
(0.13) (-1.26) (-0.41) (4.08) (-1.72) (-2.68) (-3.1) (-3.36) (-4.12) (-1.96) (0.35)
2.54E+08 5.04E+07 -3.23E+09-3.93E+09** 6.36E+08 7.71E+08** 3.21E+09** 6.17E+09** 1.16E+10* 3.65E+09*** -5.13E+08
(0.33) (0.72) (-0.86) (-1.91) (1.33) (2.14) (1.9) (1.58) (3.01) (1.69) (-0.18)
Distance n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Intercept -1.20E+08 -2.97E+06 -3.44E+08 -2.81E+07 -5.69E+07 -3.63E+07 -2.69E+08 -8.75E+08 -8.72E+08 -4.51E+08 4.31E+08
(-4.39) (-0.74) (-2.24) (-1.95) (-1.66) (-1.61) (-2.5) (-3.56) (-3.71) (-4.92) (2.51)
R-squared 0.51 0.24 0.22 0.67 0.27 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.37 0.11
Observation 53 28 117 36 36 78 49 80 67 117 80
No of  countries 9 5 20 6 6 14 9 15 12 20 14
t-robust statistics in parentheses; ***significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, * significant at 1% level
Legend: 1) Construction; 2) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 3) Manufacturing; 4) Water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation 
activities; 5) Accomodation and food service activities; 6) Administrative and support service activities; 7) Financial and insurance activities; 8)Real estate activities; 9) 
Transporting and storage; 10) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 11) Information and communication; 12) Professional, scientifc and 
Size difference x Skill 
difference
Trade cost host x Skill 
difference squared
Secondary sector Tertiary sector
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Appendix 7: Baseline Model Estimation: Firm Level Data, FDI Stock, Fixed Effects Model 
 
Quaternary 
sector
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Size sum -19.81 42.34* 72.40* 15.76 14.57* 0.08 16.09* 10.19** 79.79* 15.11* 2.81 58.48* 1.00* 15.44* 6.83
(-0,89) (3.37) (4.06) (0.52) 6.93 (0.92) (3.09) (1.96) (4.46) (1.54) (0.28) (3.21) (2.86) (10.81) (1.13)
Size difference 
squared
12.75 1.29 -19.81** -0.77 -0.64* -0.06 -0.75* -0.42** -3.44* -0.30 -0.14 -1.98* -0.05* -0.56* -0.12
(1.49) (0.24) (2.12) (-0.58) -6.25 (-1.22) (-3.04) (-1.86) (-4.7) (-0.75) (-0.31) (-2.66) (-3.83) (-8.05) (-0.46)
Skilled labour 
difference
-5.39E+07 5.21E+07** 4.70E+07 9.51E+06 -1.21E+07 7.99E+05* -2.65E+05 -3.92E+07* 4.06E+07 -1.15E+07 -2.63E+07 1.31E+07 -2.33E+05 -1.76E+06 -2.03E+07
(-1.55) (2.29) (1.31) (0.06) -1.31 (2.35) (-0.03) (-2.29) (0.74) (-0.32) (-0.29) (0.27) (0.23) (-0.31) (-0.95)
100.92** -106.44** -91.18 -36.17 -1.86 -0.8** -6.05 1.73 -12.26 24.65 2.14 56.53 -0.90 6.19** 9.11
(2.65) (-1.99) (-1.22) (-0.37) -0.36 (-2.01) (-0.61) (0.19) (-0.22) (1.15) (0.07) (0.95) (0.75) (1.85) (0.58)
Trade cost parent 1.01E+04 -9.53E+05 1.57E+06 8.41E+06 -412120** 14286*** -4.06E+05 748096*** -3.76E+06 3.98E+05 -2.88E+05 -1.55E+05 -6.55E+04 4.65E+05* 3E+06*
(0.03) (-1.2) (0.81) (0.62) -1.98 (1.81) (-0.61) (1.6) (-0.94) (0.26) (-0.1) (-0.08) (1.35) (3.25) (3.33)
Trade cost host 3.02E+05 -3.28E+06 -1.58E+06 -5.54E+05 1.23E+04 33856* -2.74E+06** -1.56E+06 -1.21E+07* 4.65E+06* -1.22E+04 1.45E+06 -184671** 7.06E+05*** 1.14E+06
(0.13) (-1.56) (-0.62) (-0.05) 0.02 (3.29) (-2.08) (1.28) (-2.33) (1.53) 0.00 (0.29) -1.85 (1.63) (0.63)
1.82E+08 -3.46E+08 1.06E+08 -1.82E+08 -1.49E+08** -1.21E+07** 1.52E+08 1.29E+08 4.61E+08 -2.94E+08 7.50E+07 -8.46E+08** 1.04E+07 8.99E+07*** -1.83E+07
(0.74) (-1.39) (0.37) (-0.11) -1.89 (-2.15) (0.96) (1.07) (0.83) (-0.88) (0.09) (-1.91) (0.97) (1.67) (-0.09)
Intercept 7.04E+06 -3.37E+07 -4.23E+07 -1.86E+07 -1.60E+07 -1.80E+04 -1.24E+07 -1.11E+07 -8.28E+07 -3.66E+07 -5.70E+06 -5.59E+07 -6.06E+05 -2.43E+07 -1.50E+07
(0.71) (-4.76) (-4.17) (-0.31) (-4.28) (-0.39) (-2.31) (-1.14) (-2.9) (-1.53) (-0.2) (-2.65) -1.52 (-9.72) (-1.36)
R-squared 0.86 0.93 0.24 0.04 0.05 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.28 0.05 0.66 0.04 0.1 0.11 0.08
Observation 17 23 164 111 3079 101 88 204 132 257 17 609 249 2036 459
No of companies 3 5 30 20 574 17 18 41 25 48 4 146 47 388 93
Primary sector Secondary sector Tertiary sector
Size difference x 
Skill difference
Trade cost host x 
Skill difference 
squared
t-robust statistics in parentheses; ***significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, * significant at 1% level
Legend: 1) Agriculture, forestry and fishing; 2) Mining and quarrying; 3) Construction; 4) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 5) Manufacturing; 6) Water supply; sewerage; waste management and 
remediation activities; 7) Accomodation and food service activities; 8) Administrative and support service activities; 9) Financial and insurance activities; 10) Information and communication; 11) Other services 
activities; 12) Real estate activities; 13) Transporting and storage; 14) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 15) Professional, scientific and technical activities
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Appendix 8: Spatial lag Model Estimation: Full Sample, FDI Stock, OLS and Maximum Likelihood Estimations 
OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6
Parent population -1.13* -0.04 0.49 0.33 -0.79* 0.02 -7.79* 1.65 0.63 2.50 0.66** -1.16***
(-4.13) (-0.11) (1.11) (0.55) (-2.6) (0.03) (-7.17) (1.23) (0.56) 91.49) (2.06) (-1.55)
Parent GDP 1.81* -1.15 0.45** 0.73 1.45* 2.52 8.38* -1.20 1.40 -9.98* -0.05 -1.06
(6.84) (0.15) (1.94) (1.06) (4.66) (1.18) (7.16) (-0.92) (0.95) (-2.54) (-0.14) (-0.66)
Parent skilled labour endowment -10.30* -6.24* -6.53* -6.57* -0.46 0.14 -11.33* 1.26 15.91* 4.45 12.71* 2.90
(-8.75) (-3.67) (-4.43) (-4.18) (-0.41) (0.08) (-8.79) (0.68) (4.20) (1.12) (7.07) (1.11)
Parent trade costs -0.31 -0.16 0.46* 0.48* 0.18 -0.21 -0.81** 0.02 -0.07 -0.24 0.81* 0.02
(-0.74) (-0.75) (3.05) (3.91) (0.67) (-1.24) (-2.34) (0.08) (-0.15) (-0.75) (3.49) (0.18)
Distance -1.31* -0.73*** -1.54* -1.63* -0.92* -0.44 1.64* 0.14 -5.12* 3.82*** -1.48* -0.35
(-6.56) (-1.59) (-32.23) (-8.98) (-4.54) (-0.37) (9.56) (0.51) (-4.00) (1.78) (-7.78) (-0.36)
Trend 0.29 0.14 0.45* 0.13 0.23 -0.09 0.15 0.39 -0.48 -0.17 0.36 0.65
(0.94) (0.36) (5.27) (0.67) (0.62) (-0.20) (0.63) (1.11) (-1.09) (-0.16) (0.98) (1.29)
Trend
2 -0.003 -0.002 -0.05* -0.04* -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.04** 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07**
(-0.06) (-0.08) (-4.53) (-3.95) (-0.38) (1.46) (-0.72) (-1.92) (1.02) (-0.26) (-0.23) (-2.05)
Parent market proximity -- 1.61** -- -0.18 -- -1.75 -- -0.73* -- 6.91* -- 2.99**
-- (1.99) -- (-0.48) -- (-0.88) -- (-2.42) -- (3.07) -- (1.90)
Host market proximity -- 6.69 -- 4.64*** -- -10.01 -- 2.96 -- 14.25 -- 5.23
-- (1.12) -- (1.71) -- (-1.13) -- (0.62) -- (1.36) -- (0.91)
Spatial lag -- -1.47* -- 0.07 -- 2.10* -- -2.06* -- -2.05** -- -1.34*
-- (-3.72) -- (0.5) -- (2.46) -- (-7.41) -- (-1.99) -- (-2.40)
Intercept 1.13 -58.30 8.95 -48.01 12.01 104.59 -38.88 11.32 38.38 -155.02 28.69 -49.24
(0.62) (-0.82) (2.88) (-1.43) (6.20) (1.02) (-6.05) (0.19) (6.67) (-1.20) (10.51) (-0.70)
R-squared 0.82 -- 0.99 -- 0.37 -- 0.87 -- 0.84 -- 0.62 --
Observation 53 53 28 28 117 117 36 36 36 36 78 78
No of countries 9 9 5 5 20 20 6 6 6 6 14 14
standard errors in parentheses; ***significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, * significant at 1% level
Secondary sector Tertiary sector
Legend: 1) Construction; 2) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 3) Manufacturing; 4) Water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation activities; 5) Accomodation and 
food service activities; 6) Administrative and support service activities; 
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Appendix 8: Spatial lag Model Estimation: Full Sample, FDI Stock, OLS and Maximum Likelihood Estimations 
 
 
OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML
7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12
Parent population -4.91* -2.76* -0.46 0.74 0.88* 0.68*** -0.09 -0.35 -1.23* -2.04* -1.16 0.30
(-5.34) (-2.77) (-1.00) (0.73) (2.61) (1.77) (-0.41) (-0.94) (-2.47) (-2.66) (-1.11) (0.20)
Parent GDP 6.45* 2.72*** 0.70 0.81 0.08 2.28* 0.83* -0.69 1.55* 2.22 1.75 -1.78
(6.39) (1.63) (1.45) (0.43) (0.25) (2.54) (3.90) (-0.54) (3.25) (1.07) (1.55) (-0.81)
Parent skilled labour -13.75* -12.21* 0.68 3.98 6.92* 6.50* 1.29 0.05 -3.13 -6.20** 3.16 4.04*
(-6.86) (-7.14) (0.42) (1.43) (3.78) (3.31) (1.47) (0.07) (-1.37) (-1.91) (1.35) (2.73)
Parent trade costs 0.26 -0.03 1.23* 0.27 1.21* 0.94* 0.42* -0.06* -0.47 -0.19 0.59 0.09
(0.60) (-0.08) (3.79) (1.51) (3.00) (2.26) (2.40) (-0.70) (-0.71) (-0.43) (0.97) (0.51)
Distance -2.12* -1.90* -1.39* -1.66 2.62* -3.70* -1.03* -0.13 -0.25 -0.93 -1.14* 0.002
(-8.13) (-4.78) (-5.52) (-1.38) (-11.85) (-7.18) (-7.09) (-0.18) (-0.84) (-0.81) (-4.26) (0.00)
Trend 0.78** 1.76** 1.08** -0.71 0.38 -0.55 0.51** 0.09 0.61 0.64 0.15 -0.85**
(1.90) (1.96) (2.05) (-0.98) (1.09) (-0.63) (1.92) (0.35) (1.05) (0.78) (0.29) (-2.01)
Trend
2 -0.10*** -0.16* -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.14* 0.01 -0.03
(-1.66) (-3.12) (-1.35) (-0.65) (-0.33) (0.17) (-1.41) (-3.24) (-1.17) (-2.44) (0.08) (-1.44)
Parent market proximity -- 0.96 -- -1.68 -- -2.05* -- 1.97*** -- -0.07 -- 2.04
-- (1.18) -- (-1.02) -- (-2.71) -- (1.77) -- (-0.04) -- (1.09)
Host market proximity -- -6.01 -- 22.34** -- 11.59 -- 9.92* -- 7.62 -- 25.21*
-- (-0.46) -- (1.96) -- (0.95) -- (2.96) -- (0.59) -- (2.95)
Spatial lag -- -2.16* -- -0.01 -- 0.58 -- -0.73*** -- -1.42*** -- -0.64
-- (-2.92) -- (-0.04) -- (1.24) -- (-1.70) -- (-1.64) -- (-1.26)
Intercept -21.00 92.96 19.26 -240.01 27.71 -113.31 14.14 -110.21 5.68 -67.88 13.39 -295.06
(-4.16) (0.59) (6.62) (-1.75) (9.00) (-0.76) (9.90) (-2.74) (1.44) (-0.44) (2.12) (-2.85)
R-squared 0.83 0.41 0.76 0.53 0.21 0.34
Observation 49 49 80 80 67 67 117 117 80 80 74 74
No of countries 9 9 15 15 12 12 20 20 14 14 13 13
standard errors in parentheses; ***significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, * significant at 1% level
Tertiary sector Quaternary sector
Legend: 7) Financial and insurance activities; 8)Real estate activities; 9) Transporting and storage; 10) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 11) Information and 
communication; 12) Professional, scientifc and technical activities
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Appendix 9: Spatial lag Model Estimation: European Sub-sample, Affiliate Sales, OLS and Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
 
OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6
Parent population -2.17* -2.48* -1.36 -3.88** -0.86* -0.48 -11.65* -5.88** -10.87* -1.37 1.61* 1.71*
(-4.57) (-3.49) (-0.81) (-2.16) (-3.08) (-1.15) (-6.89) (-2.51) (-3.03) (-0.31) (7.37) (4.5)
Parent GDP 2.77* 3.42* 1.93** 3.81** 1.41* 1.14* 12.36* 6.64* 15.00* 3.24 -0.97* -1.05*
(6.06) (3.96) (1.97) (3.01) (5.27) (2.77) (6.79) (2.71) (5.10) (0.67) (-4.47) (-2.74)
Parent skilled labour 
endowment
-16.21* -13.82*** -13.58* -6.25 1.82 0.26 -13.52* -13.71* 18.79*** 4.98 8.95* 6.35*
(-7.97) (-2.69) (-3.02) (-1.12) (1.29) (0.18) (-6.74) (-5.47) (1.70) (0.61) (5.97) (4.75)
Parent trade costs 0.07 0.10 -0.74 -0.96** 0.07 -0.07 -0.89*** -0.81** 0.79 -0.98 -0.01 0.06
(0.10) (0.2) (-1.30) (-2.01) (0.22) (-0.59) (-1.66) (-2.53) (0.76) (-1.34) (-0.05) (1.01)
Distance -1.38* -0.61 -2.27* -3.67* -1.17* -0.65 1.51* 1.15* -7.29*** -3.08 -0.57* -0.22
(-4.00) (-1.38) (-10.56) (-3.79) (-5.20) (-1.25) (5.66) (6.68) (-1.79) (-1.17) (-2.84) (-0.56)
Trend 0.90*** -0.48 0.22 0.48 0.34 0.33 0.17 0.79 -1.71*** -2.78 0.29 0.32
(1.67) (-0.38) (1.62) (1) (1.08) (0.75) (0.45) (0.95) (-1.86) (-1.58) (1.15) (1.1)
Trend
2 -0.11 0.18*** -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.10 0.19*** 0.26 -0.02 -0.04
(-1.39) (1.87) (-0.58) (0.21) (-0.93) (-1.31) (-0.61) (1.33) (1.65) (1.16) (-0.61) (-1.21)
Parent market proximity -- -5.71** -- 4.88 -- 1.89 -- 0.62 -- 4.11 -- 0.87
(-2.24) (1.51) (1.5) (0.43) (1.53) (1.01)
Host market proximity -- -23.39 -- -11.18 -- 1.66 -- -34.16** -- 11.69 -- 2.17
(-0.91) (-1.38) (0.19) (-2.13) (0.32) (0.37)
Spatial lag -- 6.26* -- -0.15 -- -0.13 -- 2.91*** -- 3.02 -- -0.15
(3.39) (-0.17) (-0.15) (1.85) (0.72) (-0.25)
Intercept -11.05 247.42 2.04 86.22 12.61 -37.71 -59.29 318.94 -13.84 -243.37 18.25 -22.85
(-3.54) (0.82) (0.22) (0.84) (5.77) (-0.36) (-5.93) (1.63) (-0.68) (-0.55) (7.14) (-0.33)
R-squared 0.69 -- 0.97 -- 0.53 -- 0.69 -- 0.60 -- 0.72 --
Observation 53 53 22 22 99 99 36 36 27 27 69 69
No of countries 9 9 4 4 17 17 6 6 5 5 12 12
standard errors in parentheses; ***significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, * significant at 1% level
Secondary sector Tertiary sector
Legend: 1) Construction; 2) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 3) Manufacturing; 4) Water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation activities; 5) 
Accomodation and food service activities; 6) Administrative and support service activities
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Appendix 9: Spatial lag Model Estimation: European Sub-sample, Affiliate Sales, OLS and Maximum Likelihood Estimations 
OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML
7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12
Parent population -2.20** -9.43* 0.07 0.35 0.36*** -0.27 0.11 0.04 -1.27* -1.97** 2.03*** 0.76
(-1.92) (-3.49) (0.22) (0.85) (1.63) (-0.66) (0.41) (0.08) (-2.52) (-2.44) (1.59) (0.4)
Parent GDP 2.71** 11.26* 0.08 -0.30 0.48** 0.88** 0.82* 0.77 1.64* 2.21* -1.25 0.33
(2.08) (3.62) (0.25) (-0.68) (2.24) (2.06) (2.96) (1.48) (3.52) (2.77) (-0.87) (0.15)
Parent skilled labour 
endowment
-1.32 -1.03 3.00** 3.18 6.87* 1.43 1.82** -0.03 1.92 -3.46 5.33** 0.89
(-0.66) (-0.99) (1.95) (1.48) (5.9) (1.26) (1.80) (-0.03) (0.83) (-0.95) (2.26) (0.27)
Parent trade costs -0.55 -0.04 0.59** 0.43** 1.07* -0.17 0.14 -0.13 0.36 0.28 -1.17*** -0.49
(-1.14) (-0.26) (2.29) (2.23) (3.92) (-1.1) (0.67) (-1.01) (0.55) (0.66) (-1.73) (-0.87)
Distance -2.24* -2.77* -1.77* -1.86* 2.86* -2.36* -1.36* -1.16* -0.63** -0.63 -1.29* -0.98
(-7.89) (-2.97) (-7.27) (-6.72) (-14.78) (-4.63) (-8.29) (-4.96) (-1.83) (-0.85) (-3.50) (-1.58)
Trend 0.07 0.19 0.69** -1** 0.02 0.05 0.53*** -0.21 0.04 0.74 0.07 -2.24
(0.17) (0.62) (1.98) (-1.14) (0.09) (0.33) (1.70) (-0.41) (0.08) (0.71) (0.13) (-1.66)
Trend
2 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.14* 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.13 0.02 -0.08***
(-0.11) (-1.23) (-0.55) (-2.25) (0.53) (-0.49) (-1.44) (0.21) (-0.2) (-1.33) (0.28) (-0.72)
Parent market proximity -- -1.45 -- -1.45 -- -0.25 -- -1.20 -- 3.63 -- 1.89
(-0.72) (-0.72) (-0.24) (0.96) (1.51) (0.74)
Host market proximity -- 2.17 -- 2.17 -- 5.22* -- 1.32 -- 6.38 -- 58.66**
(0.3) (0.3) (4.69) (0.13) (0.3) (2.14)
Spatial lag -- -0.64 -- -0.64 -- -0.39 -- 1.61*** -- -2.44 -- -0.94
(-0.9) (-0.9) (-0.97) (1.68) (-1.28) (-0.43)
Intercept 9.97 -23.27 20.85 -585.06 25.59 -34.97 11.29 -14.50 8.78 -88.05 19.30 -717.16
(1.40) (-0.27) (8.14) (-2.85) (12.25) (-2.21) (6.29) (-0.12) (2.36) (-0.34) (2.16) (-2.17)
R-squared 0.67 -- 0.66 -- 0.87 -- 0.59 -- 0.40 -- 0.53 --
Observation 44 44 68 68 61 61 102 102 69 69 67 67
No of countries 8 8 12 12 11 11 17 17 13 13 12 12
standard errors in parentheses; ***significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, * significant at 1% level
Tertiary sector
Legend:  7) Financial and insurance activities; 8)Real estate activities; 9) Transporting and storage; 10) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; 11) Information and communication; 12) Professional, scientifc and technical activities
Quaternary sector
